不对称惩罚能否遏制内生贿赂

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Lin Hu, Mandar Oak
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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文研究了贿赂惩罚不对称对贿赂行为和遵守规定的影响。贿赂金额由纳什讨价还价决定,合规和举报是战略决策。此外,对贿赂和违规行为的调查可能是相互依存的。我们发现,在对称惩罚下,诱导检举对贿赂频率没有影响。当贿赂和违规调查是独立的时,从对称惩罚到不对称惩罚的转变要么没有区别,要么导致更多的非骚扰贿赂。只有当贿赂检测增加了违规检测的机会,而不对称惩罚导致这两种类型的企业家告密时,这种转变才能成功地减少违规行为。对于非骚扰贿赂不可行的情况,该结果是稳健的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery

Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery

This paper studies the effects of asymmetric punishment of bribery on both bribery and compliance with regulations. The bribe amount is decided via Nash bargaining and regulatory compliance and whistle-blowing are strategic decisions. Moreover, investigations of bribery and noncompliance occur in a manner that may be interdependent. We show that, under symmetric punishment, inducing whistle-blowing has no effect on the frequency of bribery. When the bribery and noncompliance investigations are independent, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment either makes no difference or induces more nonharassment bribery. Only when bribery detection increases the chance of noncompliance detection and asymmetric punishment leads to whistle-blowing for both types of entrepreneurs, can the shift succeed in reducing noncompliance. The result is robust to the case where legalization of bribe-giving is not feasible for nonharassment bribes.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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