{"title":"基于锦标赛的奖励和媒体情绪","authors":"Jiayi Zheng , Hasibul Chowdhury , Md Safayat Hossain , Kartick Gupta","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100353","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We find that promotion-based tournament incentives of executives are positively associated with firms’ media sentiment. This effect is more pronounced among firms with greater need for media favourability, captured by higher information opacity, lower analyst coverage, lower industry<span> homogeneity, lower investment sentiment and lower managerial ability. Furthermore, we identify better financial performance and higher corporate branding as two channels through which tournament incentives can enhance a firm’s positive media sentiment. Our results are also robust to two quasi-natural experiments affecting promotion-based tournaments – (a) an exogenous CEO turnover due to health issues or sudden CEO death, and (b) the implementation of Say-on-Pay (SOP) law. Overall, our findings indicate that tournament-based incentives encourage a firm’s executives to showcase their skills to broader stakeholders, which consequently increases a firm’s media image.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 2","pages":"Article 100353"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Tournament-based incentives and media sentiment\",\"authors\":\"Jiayi Zheng , Hasibul Chowdhury , Md Safayat Hossain , Kartick Gupta\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100353\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We find that promotion-based tournament incentives of executives are positively associated with firms’ media sentiment. This effect is more pronounced among firms with greater need for media favourability, captured by higher information opacity, lower analyst coverage, lower industry<span> homogeneity, lower investment sentiment and lower managerial ability. Furthermore, we identify better financial performance and higher corporate branding as two channels through which tournament incentives can enhance a firm’s positive media sentiment. Our results are also robust to two quasi-natural experiments affecting promotion-based tournaments – (a) an exogenous CEO turnover due to health issues or sudden CEO death, and (b) the implementation of Say-on-Pay (SOP) law. Overall, our findings indicate that tournament-based incentives encourage a firm’s executives to showcase their skills to broader stakeholders, which consequently increases a firm’s media image.</span></p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46693,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics\",\"volume\":\"19 2\",\"pages\":\"Article 100353\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566923000036\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566923000036","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
We find that promotion-based tournament incentives of executives are positively associated with firms’ media sentiment. This effect is more pronounced among firms with greater need for media favourability, captured by higher information opacity, lower analyst coverage, lower industry homogeneity, lower investment sentiment and lower managerial ability. Furthermore, we identify better financial performance and higher corporate branding as two channels through which tournament incentives can enhance a firm’s positive media sentiment. Our results are also robust to two quasi-natural experiments affecting promotion-based tournaments – (a) an exogenous CEO turnover due to health issues or sudden CEO death, and (b) the implementation of Say-on-Pay (SOP) law. Overall, our findings indicate that tournament-based incentives encourage a firm’s executives to showcase their skills to broader stakeholders, which consequently increases a firm’s media image.