诉讼中的相互乐观与风险偏好

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2023.106157

Keith N. Hylton

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引用次数: 0

摘要

为什么有些法律纠纷不能解决？从鸟瞰的角度来看，文献提供了两类原因。一个是基于信息差异的论点。另一种是心理争论。本文对心理学理论进行了探讨。它提出了一个由风险偏好驱动的诉讼模型，并考察了该模型对审判和和解的影响。该模型为诉讼的相互乐观模型奠定了前景理论的基础。研究了该模型对原告胜诉率、和解模式以及与风险规避程度相关的信息不对称的影响。

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Mutual optimism and risk preferences in litigation

Why do some legal disputes fail to settle? From a bird’s eye view, the literature offers two categories of reasons. One consists of arguments based on informational disparities. The other consists of psychological arguments. This paper explores the psychological theory. It presents a model of litigation driven by risk preferences and examines the model’s implications for trials and settlements. The model suggests a foundation in Prospect Theory for the Mutual Optimism model of litigation. The model’s implications for plaintiff win rates, settlement patterns, and informational asymmetry with respect to the degree of risk aversion are examined.

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来源期刊

International Review of Law and Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

18.20%

发文量

审稿时长

48 days

期刊介绍： The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.