{"title":"交易网络下Top交易周期的表征","authors":"Mustafa Oğuz Afacan","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111383","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider an object reallocation problem within a specific class of trade restrictions. An agent can only receive the object of someone else connected to him, which is referred to as feasibility. We introduce a Network Augmented Top Trading Cycles (<span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mi>T</mi><mi>T</mi><mi>C</mi></mrow></math></span>) mechanism. Our main result shows that a mechanism is <span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mi>T</mi><mi>T</mi><mi>C</mi></mrow></math></span> if and only if it is feasible, individually rational, constrained efficient, and strategy-proof.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"233 ","pages":"Article 111383"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A characterization of Top Trading Cycles under trading networks\",\"authors\":\"Mustafa Oğuz Afacan\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111383\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We consider an object reallocation problem within a specific class of trade restrictions. An agent can only receive the object of someone else connected to him, which is referred to as feasibility. We introduce a Network Augmented Top Trading Cycles (<span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mi>T</mi><mi>T</mi><mi>C</mi></mrow></math></span>) mechanism. Our main result shows that a mechanism is <span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mi>T</mi><mi>T</mi><mi>C</mi></mrow></math></span> if and only if it is feasible, individually rational, constrained efficient, and strategy-proof.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":11468,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics Letters\",\"volume\":\"233 \",\"pages\":\"Article 111383\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176523004093\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176523004093","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
A characterization of Top Trading Cycles under trading networks
We consider an object reallocation problem within a specific class of trade restrictions. An agent can only receive the object of someone else connected to him, which is referred to as feasibility. We introduce a Network Augmented Top Trading Cycles () mechanism. Our main result shows that a mechanism is if and only if it is feasible, individually rational, constrained efficient, and strategy-proof.
期刊介绍:
Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.