金融脆弱性与信息设计

IF 2.1 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111356

Zhongjie Fan , Dunzhe Tang

引用次数: 0

摘要

金融脆弱性作为一种宏观市场属性，直接影响参与者的微观决策。我们研究了政府如何通过选择性地向参与者告知经济状况来实现市场繁荣。我们发现，政府的最优信息设计与金融传染和风险分担相关。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Financial fragility and information design

Financial fragility as a macro market attribute directly affects participants’ micro decisions. We study how government can achieve market prosperity through selectively inform participants on economy state. We find that government’s optimal information design is correlated with financial contagion and risk-sharing.

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.