为什么现金转移计划既能刺激又能减缓找工作

Q3 Business, Management and Accounting

IZA Journal of Labor Economics Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI:10.2478/izajole-2019-0005

J. Vargas, B. V. D. Linden

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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要本文分析了当失业者需要获得最低消费水平时，现金转移计划的行为影响。我们的模型调和了最近的证据，即现金转移对找工作率的影响可以忽略不计或有利，以及对负面影响的更标准的看法。当失业补偿金（如果有的话）足够低时，我们认为现金转移计划可以提高招聘概率。我们的框架足够灵活，可以生成标准结论。具体来看失业补偿，其最佳水平通常高于忽略消费下限时的水平。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Why Cash Transfer Programs Can Both Stimulate and Slow Down Job Finding

Abstract This article analyzes the behavioral effects of cash transfer programs when jobless people need to have access to a minimum consumption level. Our model reconciles recent evidence about negligible or favorable effects of cash transfers on job-finding rates and the more standard view of negative effects. When unemployment compensation, if any, is low enough, we argue that cash transfer programs can raise the hiring probability. Our framework is flexible enough to generate the standard conclusion as well. Looking specifically at unemployment compensation, its optimal level is generally higher than when a lower bound on consumption is ignored.

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来源期刊

IZA Journal of Labor Economics Business, Management and Accounting-Industrial Relations

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

13 weeks

期刊介绍： As of March 31, 2019, the IZA Open Access Journal Series will transfer to Sciendo. Please use the Springer Editorial Manager system for all submissions until February 28. During the transfer period in March 2019 you may direct your submissions to journals@iza.org. The IZA Journal of Labor Economics publishes scientific articles in all areas of labor economics. This refers to original high-quality theoretical and applied contributions on both microeconomic and macroeconomic labor-related topics. In particular, the IZA Journal of Labor Economics encourages submissions in subject areas that are closely linked to the various IZA Program Areas, ranging from education, family and environment to mobility, behavioral and personnel economics, and labor market institutions, among others. The IZA Journal of Labor Economics is part of IZA’s mission of contributing to social and economic discourse, enabling political decision-making to be based on the best available scientific knowledge. We want to stimulate research to close knowledge gaps. Hence, the IZA Journal of Labor Economics particularly welcomes contributions that provide scientifically sound answers to open and relevant questions of modern labor economics.