社会科学中的工具理性

Pub Date : 2023-08-11 DOI:10.1177/00483931231181930
K. Nieswandt
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文在适度的前提下得出了一些大胆的结论。我的主题是一个古老的话题,新休谟的实践理性观。首先,我认为这一观点包括两个独立的主张,工具主义和主观主义。大多数评论家把这些放在一起。工具主义是由新人类主义之外的许多理论所引起的,即任何说理性行为使某物最大化的理论。其次,我用简单的反例提出了一个反对工具主义的新论点。这一论点系统地破坏了结果主义和理性选择理论,我用它们在社会科学中的许多应用的详细例子表明了这一点。没有明显的解决办法。
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Instrumental Rationality in the Social Sciences
This paper draws some bold conclusions from modest premises. My topic is an old one, the Neohumean view of practical rationality. First, I show that this view consists of two independent claims, instrumentalism and subjectivism. Most critics run these together. Instrumentalism is entailed by many theories beyond Neohumeanism, viz., by any theory that says rational actions maximize something. Second, I give a new argument against instrumentalism, using simple counterexamples. This argument systematically undermines consequentialism and rational choice theory, I show, using detailed examples of their many social science applications. There is no obvious fix.
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