战略性多边交易中的污染：对排放征税还是在许可证市场上交易？

IF 0.8 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Bulletin of Economic Research Pub Date : 2022-10-11 DOI:10.1111/boer.12378

Ludovic A. Julien, Anicet B. Kabré, Louis de Mesnard

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在本文中，我们在Julien和Tricou（2012）的生产部门的顺序双边寡头垄断模型中引入了污染排放，该模型扩展了Gabszewicz和Michel（1997）的双边寡头垄断模式。我们提出了一个平衡概念，即排放的斯塔克伯格-库诺平衡。通过将排放建模为负外部性，我们显著地表明，在存在战略替代性（互补性）的情况下，领导者比她的直接追随者污染更多（更少）。因此，我们研究了两种控制排放水平的监管方式，即三种税收机制和许可证市场。然后，我们比较了这两种政策，我们发现偏好很重要，即经济政策的有效性也取决于偏好。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?

We introduce polluting emissions in a sequential noncooperative oligopoly model of bilateral exchange. In one sector, a leader and a follower use polluting technologies which create negative externalities on the payoffs of strategic traders who belong to the other sector. By modeling emissions as a negative externality, we show that the leader pollutes more (less) than the follower when strategies are substitutes (complements). Then, we consider the implementation of public policies to control the levels of emissions, namely, two taxation mechanisms and a permit market. We study the effects of these public policies. Moreover, we determine the conditions under which these public policies can implement a Pareto-improving allocation.

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来源期刊

Bulletin of Economic Research ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Bulletin of Economic Research is an international journal publishing articles across the entire field of economics, econometrics and economic history. The Bulletin contains original theoretical, applied and empirical work which makes a substantial contribution to the subject and is of broad interest to economists. We welcome submissions in all fields and, with the Bulletin expanding in new areas, we particularly encourage submissions in the fields of experimental economics, financial econometrics and health economics. In addition to full-length articles the Bulletin publishes refereed shorter articles, notes and comments; authoritative survey articles in all areas of economics and special themed issues.