{"title":"职业专业化、非自愿工人-公司分离和就业结果:为什么当普通医生的工作被取代时,他们的表现优于专家","authors":"Heejung Byun, Joseph Raffiee","doi":"10.1177/00018392221143762","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Existing theories offer conflicting perspectives regarding the relationship between career specialization and labor market outcomes. While some scholars argue it is better for workers to specialize and focus on one area, others argue it is advantageous for workers to diversify and compile experience across multiple work domains. We attempt to reconcile these competing perspectives by developing a theory highlighting the voluntary versus involuntary nature of worker–firm separations as a theoretical contingency that alters the relative advantages and disadvantages associated with specialized versus generalized careers. Our theory is rooted in the notion that the characteristics of involuntary worker–firm separations (i.e., job displacement) simultaneously amplify the disadvantages associated with specialized careers and the advantages associated with generalized careers, thereby giving displaced generalists a relative advantage over displaced specialists. We find support for our theory in the context of U.S. congressional staffing, using administrative employment records and a regression discontinuity identification strategy that exploits quasi-random staffer displacement resulting from narrowly decided congressional reelection bids. Our theoretical contingency is further supported in supplemental regressions where correlational evidence suggests that while specialists tend to be relatively penalized in the labor market after involuntary separations, specialists appear to be relatively privileged when separations are plausibly voluntary.","PeriodicalId":7203,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Science Quarterly","volume":"68 1","pages":"270 - 316"},"PeriodicalIF":8.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Career Specialization, Involuntary Worker–Firm Separations, and Employment Outcomes: Why Generalists Outperform Specialists When Their Jobs Are Displaced\",\"authors\":\"Heejung Byun, Joseph Raffiee\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/00018392221143762\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Existing theories offer conflicting perspectives regarding the relationship between career specialization and labor market outcomes. While some scholars argue it is better for workers to specialize and focus on one area, others argue it is advantageous for workers to diversify and compile experience across multiple work domains. We attempt to reconcile these competing perspectives by developing a theory highlighting the voluntary versus involuntary nature of worker–firm separations as a theoretical contingency that alters the relative advantages and disadvantages associated with specialized versus generalized careers. Our theory is rooted in the notion that the characteristics of involuntary worker–firm separations (i.e., job displacement) simultaneously amplify the disadvantages associated with specialized careers and the advantages associated with generalized careers, thereby giving displaced generalists a relative advantage over displaced specialists. We find support for our theory in the context of U.S. congressional staffing, using administrative employment records and a regression discontinuity identification strategy that exploits quasi-random staffer displacement resulting from narrowly decided congressional reelection bids. Our theoretical contingency is further supported in supplemental regressions where correlational evidence suggests that while specialists tend to be relatively penalized in the labor market after involuntary separations, specialists appear to be relatively privileged when separations are plausibly voluntary.\",\"PeriodicalId\":7203,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Administrative Science Quarterly\",\"volume\":\"68 1\",\"pages\":\"270 - 316\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Administrative Science Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/00018392221143762\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Administrative Science Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00018392221143762","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Career Specialization, Involuntary Worker–Firm Separations, and Employment Outcomes: Why Generalists Outperform Specialists When Their Jobs Are Displaced
Existing theories offer conflicting perspectives regarding the relationship between career specialization and labor market outcomes. While some scholars argue it is better for workers to specialize and focus on one area, others argue it is advantageous for workers to diversify and compile experience across multiple work domains. We attempt to reconcile these competing perspectives by developing a theory highlighting the voluntary versus involuntary nature of worker–firm separations as a theoretical contingency that alters the relative advantages and disadvantages associated with specialized versus generalized careers. Our theory is rooted in the notion that the characteristics of involuntary worker–firm separations (i.e., job displacement) simultaneously amplify the disadvantages associated with specialized careers and the advantages associated with generalized careers, thereby giving displaced generalists a relative advantage over displaced specialists. We find support for our theory in the context of U.S. congressional staffing, using administrative employment records and a regression discontinuity identification strategy that exploits quasi-random staffer displacement resulting from narrowly decided congressional reelection bids. Our theoretical contingency is further supported in supplemental regressions where correlational evidence suggests that while specialists tend to be relatively penalized in the labor market after involuntary separations, specialists appear to be relatively privileged when separations are plausibly voluntary.
期刊介绍:
Administrative Science Quarterly, under the ownership and management of the Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University, has consistently been a pioneer in organizational studies since the inception of the field. As a premier journal, it consistently features the finest theoretical and empirical papers derived from dissertations, along with the latest contributions from well-established scholars. Additionally, the journal showcases interdisciplinary work in organizational theory and offers insightful book reviews.