体育比赛中的腐败和自毁行为——操纵比赛行为及威慑因素影响的实验研究

IF 1.8 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Sports Economics Pub Date : 2022-11-13 DOI:10.1177/15270025221134239

Thomas Giel, Sören Dallmeyer, D. Memmert, C. Breuer

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引用次数: 0

摘要

这项研究调查了在实验环境中使用两人比赛的假球。受试者在一项真正的努力任务中竞争，并一度被贿赂进行自我破坏。基于贝克尔威慑假说，运用期望效用框架，通过不同的处理方法分析威慑因素的有效性。结果表明，大多数参与者并没有最大化他们的金钱回报，与金钱惩罚的严重程度相比，检测概率的增加对受贿有更高的威慑作用，表现水平较低的参与者更有可能受贿。这对体育管理机构打击假球行为产生了影响。

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Corruption and Self-Sabotage in Sporting Competitions – An Experimental Approach to Match-Fixing Behavior and the Influence of Deterrence Factors

This study investigates match-fixing employing a 2-player contest in an experimental setting. Subjects compete in a real-effort task and are bribed onetime to self-sabotage. Based on Becker’s deterrence hypothesis, the effectiveness of deterrent factors is analyzed via different treatments applying an expected utility framework. Results show that the majority of participants do not maximize their monetary payoff, that increasing detection probability has a higher deterring effect on bribe acceptance compared to severity of monetary punishment, and that participants with lower performance levels were more likely to accept bribes. Implications are derived for sport governing bodies to operate against match-fixing.

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来源期刊

Journal of Sports Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

17.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Journal of Sports Economics publishes scholarly research in the field of sports economics. The aim of the journal is to further research in the area of sports economics by bringing together theoretical and empirical research in a single intellectual venue. Relevant topics include: labor market research; labor-management relations; collective bargaining; wage determination; local public finance; and other fields related to the economics of sports. Published quarterly, the Journal of Sports Economics is unique in that it is the only journal devoted specifically to this rapidly growing field.