部分银行联盟的局限性：一种政治经济学方法

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2018-04-01 DOI:10.1257/AER.20141388

Dana Foarta

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引用次数: 21

摘要

本文研究了“部分银行联盟”的福利效应，在该联盟中，跨国援助转移设定在超国家层面，但成员国的政策制定者决定资金的分配。这使得自利的政策制定者能够在救助过程中提取租金。在均衡状态下，与自给自足的情况相比，这样的银行联盟实际上可以降低接受转移的国家公民的福利，因为接受国必须增加其在救助总体负担中的份额，以补偿寻租扭曲。超国家财政规则在扭转这一结果方面是无效的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Limits to Partial Banking Unions: A Political Economy Approach

This paper studies the welfare effects of a "partial banking union" in which cross-country transfers for bailouts are set at the supranational level, but policymakers in member countries decide the distribution of funds. This allows the self-interested policymakers to extract rents in the bailout process. In equilibrium, such a banking union can actually lower the welfare of citizens in the country receiving transfers compared to the autarky case, as the receiving country must increase its share of the overall burden of the bailout, in order to compensate for the rent-seeking distortion. Supranational fiscal rules are ineffective at reversing this result.

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.