家族企业收购与政治家担任董事：一种社会动力财富方法

IF 9.9 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Family Business Review Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI:10.1177/08944865231162404

Gloria Cuevas-Rodríguez, Leticia Pérez‐Calero, L. Gómez‐Mejía, Santiago Kopoboru Aguado

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引用次数: 2

摘要

本研究使用社会情感财富（SEW）方法分析了家族控制如何影响企业的收购活动，并讨论了企业在做出收购决策时预期的SEW收益和损失。从2010年至2015年从西班牙上市公司收集的数据表明，家族企业比非家族企业更不愿进行收购，当董事会中没有能够减少潜在SEW损失的前政治家时，家族企业的收购倾向更为明显。此外，家族企业董事会前政客在收购活动方面的好处只出现在低速行业。

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Family Firms’ Acquisitions and Politicians as Directors: A Socioemotional Wealth Approach

This study analyzes how family control influences firms’ acquisition activity using a socioemotional wealth (SEW) approach and discusses their anticipated SEW gains and losses when making acquisition decisions. Data collected from Spanish public companies from 2010 to 2015 indicates that family firms are more reticent about undertaking acquisitions than nonfamily firms, and their lower propensity is more pronounced when there are no former politicians on the board of directors whose presence could reduce potential SEW losses. Furthermore, the benefits of former politicians on the board of family firms in terms of acquisition activity only occur in low-velocity industries.

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来源期刊

Family Business Review BUSINESS-

CiteScore

12.40

自引率

13.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Family Business Review (FBR) has been a refereed journal since 1988, serving as the premier scholarly publication dedicated to the study of family-controlled enterprises. It delves into the dynamics of these businesses, encompassing a range of sizes from small to very large. FBR concentrates not only on the entrepreneurial founding generation but also on family enterprises in subsequent generations, including some of the world's oldest companies. The journal also publishes interdisciplinary research covering families of wealth, family foundations, and offices.