改革时代的魅力:后毛时代中国的算命热，1980 - 1990年*

IF 1.8 1区历史学 Q1 HISTORY

Past & Present Pub Date : 2021-01-25 DOI:10.1093/PASTJ/GTAA019

Emily Baum

{"title":"改革时代的魅力:后毛时代中国的算命热，1980 - 1990年*","authors":"Emily Baum","doi":"10.1093/PASTJ/GTAA019","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Soon after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China experienced a ‘fortune-telling fever’. After having been suppressed by the Chinese Communist Party for the previous three decades, fortune tellers re-emerged in the 1980s to publish extensively on the topic and ply their trade in public. Yet despite the general relaxation of state policies toward folk beliefs, fortune telling was still considered a ‘superstition’ and therefore remained against the law. To bypass ongoing proscriptions against divinatory practices and publications, fortune tellers began to frame their undertakings in a language that closely mirrored two priorities of the post-Mao state: the advancement of scientific research and the reclamation of traditional culture. As this article argues, the example of China’s fortune-telling fever adds a new perspective to studies that have viewed the resurgence of Chinese spirituality as a form of communal resistance against an atheist regime. Rather than combating the government’s accusation that their practices were superstitious, fortune tellers instead positioned themselves as allies of the state by appealing to its rhetoric of science and cultural nationalism. Downplaying the mystical qualities of their craft, they framed divination as an academic and economic endeavour, one that was both compatible with secular modernity and in keeping with the Chinese Communist Party’s demands for entrepreneurial activity.","PeriodicalId":47870,"journal":{"name":"Past & Present","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/PASTJ/GTAA019","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Enchantment in an Age of Reform: Fortune-Telling Fever in Post-Mao China, 1980s–1990s*\",\"authors\":\"Emily Baum\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/PASTJ/GTAA019\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Soon after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China experienced a ‘fortune-telling fever’. After having been suppressed by the Chinese Communist Party for the previous three decades, fortune tellers re-emerged in the 1980s to publish extensively on the topic and ply their trade in public. Yet despite the general relaxation of state policies toward folk beliefs, fortune telling was still considered a ‘superstition’ and therefore remained against the law. To bypass ongoing proscriptions against divinatory practices and publications, fortune tellers began to frame their undertakings in a language that closely mirrored two priorities of the post-Mao state: the advancement of scientific research and the reclamation of traditional culture. As this article argues, the example of China’s fortune-telling fever adds a new perspective to studies that have viewed the resurgence of Chinese spirituality as a form of communal resistance against an atheist regime. Rather than combating the government’s accusation that their practices were superstitious, fortune tellers instead positioned themselves as allies of the state by appealing to its rhetoric of science and cultural nationalism. Downplaying the mystical qualities of their craft, they framed divination as an academic and economic endeavour, one that was both compatible with secular modernity and in keeping with the Chinese Communist Party’s demands for entrepreneurial activity.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47870,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Past & Present\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/PASTJ/GTAA019\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Past & Present\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/PASTJ/GTAA019\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Past & Present","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PASTJ/GTAA019","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

1976年毛泽东去世后不久，中国出现了“算命热”。在被中国共产党镇压了三十年之后，算命师在20世纪80年代重新出现，就这个话题发表了大量文章，并在公开场合进行了交易。然而，尽管国家对民间信仰的政策普遍放松，算命仍然被认为是一种“迷信”，因此仍然是违法的。为了绕过对占卜术和出版物的持续禁令，算命师开始用一种与后毛时代的两个优先事项密切相关的语言来阐述他们的事业：科学研究的进步和传统文化的复兴。正如这篇文章所说，中国算命热的例子为那些将中国精神的复兴视为对无神论政权的共同抵抗的研究提供了一个新的视角。算命先生没有反对政府指责他们的做法是迷信的，而是通过诉诸国家的科学和文化民族主义言论，将自己定位为国家的盟友。他们淡化了占卜术的神秘品质，将占卜视为一种学术和经济努力，既符合世俗的现代性，也符合中国共产党对创业活动的要求。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Enchantment in an Age of Reform: Fortune-Telling Fever in Post-Mao China, 1980s–1990s*

Soon after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China experienced a ‘fortune-telling fever’. After having been suppressed by the Chinese Communist Party for the previous three decades, fortune tellers re-emerged in the 1980s to publish extensively on the topic and ply their trade in public. Yet despite the general relaxation of state policies toward folk beliefs, fortune telling was still considered a ‘superstition’ and therefore remained against the law. To bypass ongoing proscriptions against divinatory practices and publications, fortune tellers began to frame their undertakings in a language that closely mirrored two priorities of the post-Mao state: the advancement of scientific research and the reclamation of traditional culture. As this article argues, the example of China’s fortune-telling fever adds a new perspective to studies that have viewed the resurgence of Chinese spirituality as a form of communal resistance against an atheist regime. Rather than combating the government’s accusation that their practices were superstitious, fortune tellers instead positioned themselves as allies of the state by appealing to its rhetoric of science and cultural nationalism. Downplaying the mystical qualities of their craft, they framed divination as an academic and economic endeavour, one that was both compatible with secular modernity and in keeping with the Chinese Communist Party’s demands for entrepreneurial activity.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Past & Present Multiple-

CiteScore

2.80

自引率

5.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Founded in 1952, Past & Present is widely acknowledged to be the liveliest and most stimulating historical journal in the English-speaking world. The journal offers: •A wide variety of scholarly and original articles on historical, social and cultural change in all parts of the world. •Four issues a year, each containing five or six major articles plus occasional debates and review essays. •Challenging work by young historians as well as seminal articles by internationally regarded scholars. •A range of articles that appeal to specialists and non-specialists, and communicate the results of the most recent historical research in a readable and lively form. •A forum for debate, encouraging productive controversy.