如果你喜欢我,请不要“喜欢”我:从正面评论推断供应商比特币地址

Jochen Schäfer, Christian Müller, Frederik Armknecht
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要比特币和类似的加密货币作为一种支付方式在合法和非法的在线市场上越来越受欢迎。此类市场通常会部署一个审查系统,允许用户对其购买进行评分,并帮助其他人确定可靠的供应商。因此,供应商有兴趣积累尽可能多的正面评价(点赞),并将其公开。然而,我们提出了一种利用这些公开信息来识别可能属于供应商的加密货币地址的攻击。在其基本变体中,它侧重于重用其地址的供应商。我们还展示了一个扩展变体,它可以处理地址只使用一次的情况。我们通过基于两个独立暗网市场的供应商审查对比特币交易进行建模,并从区块链中检索匹配的交易,来证明攻击的适用性。通过这样做,我们可以识别可能属于暗网市场供应商的比特币地址。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
If You Like Me, Please Don’t “Like” Me: Inferring Vendor Bitcoin Addresses From Positive Reviews
Abstract Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies are becoming increasingly popular as a payment method in both legitimate and illegitimate online markets. Such markets usually deploy a review system that allows users to rate their purchases and help others to determine reliable vendors. Consequently, vendors are interested into accumulating as many positive reviews (likes) as possible and to make these public. However, we present an attack that exploits these publicly available information to identify cryptocurrency addresses potentially belonging to vendors. In its basic variant, it focuses on vendors that reuse their addresses. We also show an extended variant that copes with the case that addresses are used only once. We demonstrate the applicability of the attack by modeling Bitcoin transactions based on vendor reviews of two separate darknet markets and retrieve matching transactions from the blockchain. By doing so, we can identify Bitcoin addresses likely belonging to darknet market vendors.
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