The imaginary and epistemology of disaster preparedness: The case of Japan's nuclear safety failure

The Fukushima nuclear disaster was profoundly a man-made one, resulting from the organizational failure of nuclear emergency preparedness. To fully understand the cause of this disaster, I propose to extend an organizational perspective on disasters into a macro-institutional perspective on disaster preparedness. To this end, I borrow from science and technology studies the concepts of "sociotechnical imaginary" and "civic epistemology" to probe the deepest layers of meaning-making constitutive of disaster preparedness. I then apply these concepts to the history of nuclear energy in postwar Japan that was centered on the developmental state pursuing industrial transformation. Specifically, I illustrate how the "pacifist imaginary" emphasized positive contributions of "the peaceful use of nuclear energy," legitimating a priori the promotion of nuclear power as a means of economic development; and how the "technocratic epistemology" invoked the superior competencies of state bureaucrats and expert advisers, legitimating post hoc their disregard for the possibility of a severe accident. The imaginary and epistemology thus enabled the developmental state to pursue pro-nuclear policy by securing acquiescence from the majority of citizens and discrediting the minority of antinuclear activists – until the earthquake and tsunami exposed the preparedness failure in March 2011.