从法律上反对相信奇迹

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Gesiel DA Silva
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引用次数: 0

摘要

Alvin Plantinga(1993a,1993b,2000)认为,法律上对有神论的反对取决于事实上的反对:为了说对上帝的信仰是不合理的,人们应该首先假设这种信仰是错误的。假设普兰廷加的认识论和他事实上/法律上的区别,在这篇文章中,我认为,为了证明对奇迹的信仰是不合理的,我们必须假设对奇迹的信念总是错误的。因此,一个对奇迹持怀疑态度的人必须选择要么找到证据证明所有所谓的奇迹都是假的,要么承认自己是以宗教承诺为起点的。陪审团反对相信奇迹435 Manuscrito–Rev.Int.Fil。坎皮纳斯诉44案,第4号,第434-452页,2021年10月至12月。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES
Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point. The De Jure Objection Against Belief in Miracles 435 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 44, n. 4, pp. 434-452, Oct.-Dec. 2021.
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来源期刊
Manuscrito
Manuscrito PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
31
审稿时长
32 weeks
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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