社会学还是心理学?

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
A. Kuznetsov
{"title":"社会学还是心理学?","authors":"A. Kuznetsov","doi":"10.5840/eps202057345","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The article is an attempt at the reverse engineering of conceptual architecture and logic of David Bloor's Strong Programme (SP) in the sociology of scientific knowledge via explicating key resources and interpretative techniques for constructing it. To do this I show how problematic is a conventional interpretation of the SP as a radicalization of Kuhn's theory of science and as a sociologization of epistemology. This problematization allows me to put anew three questions concerning the SP. In what sense it is post-positivist? In what sense it is sociological? Does it belong to social epistemology? To answer these questions I set myself four tasks. First, Bloor’s theoretical position concerning the Kuhn-Popper debate is located. Second, I point to and present Mary Hesse’s network model of science (NM) as a crucial theoretical source for the early SP. Third, I analyze in detail how Bloor interpreted and appropriated NM. Finally, I show what theoretical and methodological effects this interpretation had for the SP as presented in 1976. The general layout of the conceptual architecture of SP is modeled on the Hesse’s NM. It combines the principle of correspondence and that of coherence and sees the language of science as a network of predicates and laws segmented by contingent and empirical boundaries and not a priori logical divisions between theory and observation. But Bloor creatively interprets and appropriates NM by the double move of generalization and specification. Whereas Hesse’s NM refers to the functioning of scientific language, in Bloor’s hands, it comes to describe human learning in general inscribed in psychological processes (perception and thinking). As a result, SP is based on a form of psychological empiricism that sees science as a two-storied building. The first floor (perception) ensures correspondence and the second one (thinking) provide conditions of coherence. SP of 1976 is a specific model for the sociological segmentation of the second floor.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"57 1","pages":"105-124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/eps202057345","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Sociology or Psychology?\",\"authors\":\"A. Kuznetsov\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/eps202057345\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The article is an attempt at the reverse engineering of conceptual architecture and logic of David Bloor's Strong Programme (SP) in the sociology of scientific knowledge via explicating key resources and interpretative techniques for constructing it. To do this I show how problematic is a conventional interpretation of the SP as a radicalization of Kuhn's theory of science and as a sociologization of epistemology. This problematization allows me to put anew three questions concerning the SP. In what sense it is post-positivist? In what sense it is sociological? Does it belong to social epistemology? To answer these questions I set myself four tasks. First, Bloor’s theoretical position concerning the Kuhn-Popper debate is located. Second, I point to and present Mary Hesse’s network model of science (NM) as a crucial theoretical source for the early SP. Third, I analyze in detail how Bloor interpreted and appropriated NM. Finally, I show what theoretical and methodological effects this interpretation had for the SP as presented in 1976. The general layout of the conceptual architecture of SP is modeled on the Hesse’s NM. It combines the principle of correspondence and that of coherence and sees the language of science as a network of predicates and laws segmented by contingent and empirical boundaries and not a priori logical divisions between theory and observation. But Bloor creatively interprets and appropriates NM by the double move of generalization and specification. Whereas Hesse’s NM refers to the functioning of scientific language, in Bloor’s hands, it comes to describe human learning in general inscribed in psychological processes (perception and thinking). As a result, SP is based on a form of psychological empiricism that sees science as a two-storied building. The first floor (perception) ensures correspondence and the second one (thinking) provide conditions of coherence. SP of 1976 is a specific model for the sociological segmentation of the second floor.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44031,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki\",\"volume\":\"57 1\",\"pages\":\"105-124\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-08-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/eps202057345\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057345\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057345","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文试图通过解释构建科学知识社会学的关键资源和解释技术,对戴维•布卢尔(David Bloor)的Strong program (SP)的概念架构和逻辑进行逆向工程。要做到这一点,我要说明,把SP作为库恩科学理论的激进化和认识论的社会化的传统解释是多么有问题。这种问题化让我重新提出三个关于SP的问题:在什么意义上它是后实证主义的?在什么意义上它是社会学的?它属于社会认识论吗?为了回答这些问题,我给自己设定了四个任务。首先,确定了布卢尔在库恩-波普尔之争中的理论立场。其次,我指出并展示了玛丽·黑塞的科学网络模型(NM)作为早期SP的重要理论来源。第三,我详细分析了布卢尔是如何解释和挪用NM的。最后,我展示了这种解释对1976年提出的SP产生的理论和方法上的影响。SP概念架构的总体布局是在Hesse的NM基础上建模的。它结合了对应原则和连贯原则,并将科学语言视为由偶然和经验边界分割的谓词和定律的网络,而不是理论和观察之间先验的逻辑划分。而布洛尔则通过泛化和规范的双重动作,创造性地诠释和挪用了网络管理。黑塞的NM指的是科学语言的功能,而布卢尔的NM指的是一般镌刻在心理过程(感知和思考)中的人类学习。因此,SP是建立在一种把科学看作两层楼的心理经验主义的基础上的。第一层(感知)确保对应,第二层(思维)提供连贯的条件。1976年的SP是二层社会学分割的具体模型。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Sociology or Psychology?
The article is an attempt at the reverse engineering of conceptual architecture and logic of David Bloor's Strong Programme (SP) in the sociology of scientific knowledge via explicating key resources and interpretative techniques for constructing it. To do this I show how problematic is a conventional interpretation of the SP as a radicalization of Kuhn's theory of science and as a sociologization of epistemology. This problematization allows me to put anew three questions concerning the SP. In what sense it is post-positivist? In what sense it is sociological? Does it belong to social epistemology? To answer these questions I set myself four tasks. First, Bloor’s theoretical position concerning the Kuhn-Popper debate is located. Second, I point to and present Mary Hesse’s network model of science (NM) as a crucial theoretical source for the early SP. Third, I analyze in detail how Bloor interpreted and appropriated NM. Finally, I show what theoretical and methodological effects this interpretation had for the SP as presented in 1976. The general layout of the conceptual architecture of SP is modeled on the Hesse’s NM. It combines the principle of correspondence and that of coherence and sees the language of science as a network of predicates and laws segmented by contingent and empirical boundaries and not a priori logical divisions between theory and observation. But Bloor creatively interprets and appropriates NM by the double move of generalization and specification. Whereas Hesse’s NM refers to the functioning of scientific language, in Bloor’s hands, it comes to describe human learning in general inscribed in psychological processes (perception and thinking). As a result, SP is based on a form of psychological empiricism that sees science as a two-storied building. The first floor (perception) ensures correspondence and the second one (thinking) provide conditions of coherence. SP of 1976 is a specific model for the sociological segmentation of the second floor.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
25.00%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: Epistemology & Philosophy of Science is a quarterly peer-reviewed journal established in 2004 by the Institute of Philosophy (Russian Academy of Sciences). It is devoted to the themes in modern epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The journal supports the policy of interdisciplinarity. It’s based on the belief that the comprehensive analysis of cultural phenomena couldn’t be completed without focusing on the problems of cognition. The epistemological analysis, however, needs the research results from human, social and natural sciences. Sections of the journal: 1.Editorial 2.Panel Discussion 3.Epistemology and Cognition 4.Language and Mind 5.Vista 6.Case Studies -Science Studies 7.Interdisciplinary Studies 8.Archive 9.Symposium 10.Book Reviews
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信