情绪行动:一种新方法

IF 0.3 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
David Pineda
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引用次数: 0

摘要

最近关于情感行为的哲学文献分为两派,一派认为,尽管情感行为具有种种特点,但实际上可以按照休谟的思路来解释,即用信念-欲望对来解释;情感主义者,他们认为情感行为只能通过诉诸情感和他们的一些特殊特征来解释。在回顾这一哲学讨论之后,我将论证,首先,所分析的情感行为的哲学解释,无论是休谟的还是情感主义者的,都不够令人满意。其次,我认为这种哲学辩论已经陷入了僵局,它不允许进一步的进展,也无法为我们提供一个令人信服的解释,说明这种情感行为,其中涉及的目标并不明显。第三,我认为,为了克服这种僵局,我们需要以一种完全不同的方式来处理情感行为。借鉴一些心理学家的观点,我认为相关的哲学问题应该是情感行为是否以目标为导向。最后,我将提出如何根据这种新方法来解释情绪行为,特别是最令人困惑的行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Emotional actions: A new approach
The recent philosophical literature on emotional action is divided between Humeans, who think that emotional action, for all its peculiarities, can in fact be explained along Humean lines, that is, with belief–desire pairs; and emotionists, who think that emotional actions can only be explained by appealing to emotions and some of their special features. After reviewing this philosophical discussion, I will argue, first, that none of the philosophical accounts of emotional action analysed, whether Humean or emotionist, is satisfactory enough. Second, I will argue that this philosophical debate has reached a stalemate, which does not allow further progress and which has not been able to provide us with a compelling account of such emotional actions where it is not obvious which is the goal involved. Third, I will argue that in order to overcome this stalemate, we need to approach emotional action in a radically different way. Drawing on ideas from some psychologists, I will suggest that the relevant philosophical issue should be whether emotional action is, or is not, goal‐directed. Finally, I will suggest how emotional actions, particularly the most puzzling ones, can be accounted for according to this new approach.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
65
期刊介绍: Since its foundation in 1935, Theoria publishes research in all areas of philosophy. Theoria is committed to precision and clarity in philosophical discussions, and encourages cooperation between philosophy and other disciplines. The journal is not affiliated with any particular school or faction. Instead, it promotes dialogues between different philosophical viewpoints. Theoria is peer-reviewed. It publishes articles, reviews, and shorter notes and discussions. Short discussion notes on recent articles in Theoria are welcome.
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