监管报告的成本和信息性:来自英国的证据

IF 4.6 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Shuai Yuan
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引用次数: 1

摘要

2006年欧盟指令建立了一个欧盟范围内的审计行业公共监督体系。在英国,自2008年以来,财务报告委员会(FRC)已经发布了对主要审计公司的检查报告,其中包括对每个审计公司的个别审计业务的总体质量评级。本研究考察了FRC的评级,并衡量了它们对审计费用和审计公司转换的影响。当审计事务所有较高比例的业务评级不足时,审计费用会大幅增加,这可能是由于需要额外的努力和资源来满足财务汇报局的要求。这种影响更多地集中在四大审计事务所的客户身上。然而,没有证据表明FRC评级会影响客户切换审计事务所的可能性,这表明检查结果可能并不表明审计质量,因此不会影响客户的审计事务所任命决策。结果表明,检查等级可能会增加审计成本,但在区分审计质量方面可能没有价值,因此对审计委员会的审计事务所任命决策没有影响。这一发现促进了对审计检查制度有效性的理解,并为审计监管机构的政策制定提供了指导。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cost and Informativeness of Regulatory Reports: Evidence from the UK
Abstract The 2006 EU Directive established an EU-wide system for public oversight of the audit profession. In the UK, since 2008 the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has published inspection reports for major audit firms, which include overall quality ratings for the individual audit engagements of each audit firm under review. This study examines the FRC’s ratings, and measures their impact on audit fees and audit firm switching. A significant increase in audit fees is found when the audit firm has a higher proportion of engagements with deficient ratings, probably arising from the additional effort and resources needed to meet the FRC’s requirements. This impact is more concentrated among clients with Big 4 audit firms. However, there is no evidence that FRC ratings affect clients’ likelihood of switching audit firms, suggesting that inspection results may not signal audit quality, and thus do not affect clients’ audit firm appointment decisions. The results provide evidence that inspection ratings may increase audit costs, but may not be valuable in distinguishing audit quality, and thus have no effect on audit committees’ audit firm appointment decisions. This finding advances understanding of the effectiveness of the audit inspection regime, and provides auditing regulators with guidance on policy making.
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来源期刊
Accounting in Europe
Accounting in Europe BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
14
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