员工持股计划如何影响企业市场价值:利益冲突理论方法

IF 3.4 3区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Phan Huy Hieu Tran, Thu Ha Tran, Ji-Yong Lee
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了市场对有员工持股计划(ESOP)的银行是否比没有员工持股计划的银行更看重。通过使用各种经验模型,我们发现 ESOP 提高了银行的市场价值。然而,只有当银行是透明的或位于股东保护较强的国家时,才会产生这种积极影响。我们的研究结果表明,如果银行不透明或股东保护薄弱,外部投资者对广泛持股银行的管理层固化以及紧密持股银行的大股东与经理人之间的幕后关系的担忧就会超过 ESOP 的预期收益。我们的研究提出了一种新方法,通过利益冲突理论的棱镜来研究 ESOP 的影响,为相关文献做出了贡献。我们的研究结果还揭示了利益相关者反对或采用 ESOP 的理由。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How employee share ownership plans impact firms' market value: A conflict of interest theory approach

We investigated whether the market places a higher value on banks with employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) than on those without them. Using a variety of empirical models, we found that ESOPs increased the market value of banks. However, this positive effect occurred only when banks were transparent or located in countries with strong shareholder protection. Our findings demonstrated that if banks were opaque or shareholder protection was weak, outside investors' concerns about managerial entrenchment in widely held banks and behind-the-scenes relationships between majority shareholders and managers in closely held banks outweighed the perceived benefits of ESOPs. Our study contributes to the literature by proposing a novel approach to study the effects of ESOPs through the prism of conflict of interest theory. Our findings also shed light on stakeholders' rationales for opposing or adopting ESOPs.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.20
自引率
13.50%
发文量
52
期刊介绍: The European Management Review is an international journal dedicated to advancing the understanding of management in private and public sector organizations through empirical investigation and theoretical analysis. The European Management Review provides an international forum for dialogue between researchers, thereby improving the understanding of the nature of management in different settings and promoting the transfer of research results to management practice. Although one of the European Management Review"s aims is to foster the general advancement of management scholarship among European scholars and/or those academics interested in European management issues.
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