国内冲突中的网络竞争与平民目标

IF 4.6 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
C. Dorff, Max Gallop, Shahryar Minhas
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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要:本文以最近的文献发展为基础,解决了国内冲突研究中的一个突出研究问题:如何解释针对平民的暴力行为?我们使用一种新的计算模型来研究网络环境下受害者的策略激励;一个包含了平民的战略行为。我们认为,无论冲突的总体强度或参与者总数如何,具有高度网络竞争的冲突——任何两个参与者之间的冲突更有可能发生——都会导致更高的平民受害率。我们在跨国环境中使用事件数据来测试我们的理论,以产生冲突强度和网络密度的度量。实证分析支持我们模型的发现,即具有高水平网络竞争的冲突系统与更高水平的针对平民的暴力有关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Network Competition and Civilian Targeting during Civil Conflict
Abstract Building on recent developments in the literature, this article addresses a prominent research question in the study of civil conflict: what explains violence against civilians? We use a novel computational model to investigate the strategic incentives for victimization in a network setting; one that incorporates civilians’ strategic behavior. We argue that conflicts with high network competition—where conflict between any two actors is more likely—lead to higher rates of civilian victimization, irrespective of the conflict's overall intensity or total number of actors. We test our theory in a cross-national setting using event data to generate measures of both conflict intensity and network density. Empirical analysis supports our model's finding that conflict systems with high levels of network competition are associated with a higher level of violence against the civilian population.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.70
自引率
4.00%
发文量
64
期刊介绍: The British Journal of Political Science is a broadly based journal aiming to cover developments across a wide range of countries and specialisms. Contributions are drawn from all fields of political science (including political theory, political behaviour, public policy and international relations), and articles from scholars in related disciplines (sociology, social psychology, economics and philosophy) appear frequently. With a reputation established over nearly 40 years of publication, the British Journal of Political Science is widely recognised as one of the premier journals in its field.
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