中等收入陷阱与腐败:来自动态面板数据分析的证据

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS
Joshua Ping Ang , Fang Dong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文通过分析一个将腐败明确纳入资本积累的租金提取的增长模型的收敛速度,对收入陷阱现象进行了实证检验。我们的模型显示,这些国家被“困”在中等收入群体中,因为它们腐败。既然他们没有一个更少腐败的经济,那么他们的生产力就会降低,也没有足够和必要的资本来发展。通过对76个中等收入经济体1998 - 2020年的联立方程动态面板数据模型的应用,并使用迭代GLS估计方法,结果表明,高腐败国家(即腐败指数的负控制)比低腐败国家(即腐败指数的正控制)更接近自身的稳定状态。这意味着中等收入群体中的一些国家存在中等收入陷阱,我们在本文中对此进行了定义。我们发现腐败对这些经济体的实际人均GDP的不利影响,以及在确定中等收入国家的不同稳定状态时的不利影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Middle-income trap and corruption: Evidence from a dynamic panel data analysis

This paper empirically tests the income trap phenomenon by analyzing the convergence rate of a growth model that incorporates corruption explicitly as a rent extraction out of capital accumulation. Our model shows that the countries are ‘trapped’ in a middle-income group because they are corrupt. Since they failed to have a less corrupt economy, then they would be less productive and do not have the sufficient and necessary capital to develop. By applying a simultaneous equations dynamic panel data model to 76 middle-income economies from 1998 to 2020 and using the iterated GLS estimation method, the results show that countries with high corruption (i.e., negative control of corruption index) are closer to their own steady state than countries with low corruption (i.e., positive control of corruption index) are. This implies the existence of a middle-income trap, which we define in this paper, for some of the countries in the middle-income group. We find the adverse effect of corruption on real GDP per capita in these economies, and in determining the different steady states among middle-income countries.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
37
审稿时长
89 days
期刊介绍: Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.
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