{"title":"奥斯汀怀疑论之道的实践:哲学方法随笔","authors":"Mark Kaplan","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10039","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nAustin wrote as if what we say as epistemologists needs to accord faithfully with what we say, and are committed to saying, in ordinary life. The consensus has long been that Austin wrote this way because he simply didn’t understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. Austin’s Way with Skepticism explains why the consensus is mistaken. The book shows that, far from reflecting a failure on Austin’s part to understand the epistemologist’s project, Austin’s fidelity requirement was born of a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived. The book also provides evidence of just how fruitful an epistemology is to be had, once we take that critique to heart and do epistemology as Austin thought it should be done.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Précis of Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method\",\"authors\":\"Mark Kaplan\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/22105700-bja10039\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nAustin wrote as if what we say as epistemologists needs to accord faithfully with what we say, and are committed to saying, in ordinary life. The consensus has long been that Austin wrote this way because he simply didn’t understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. Austin’s Way with Skepticism explains why the consensus is mistaken. The book shows that, far from reflecting a failure on Austin’s part to understand the epistemologist’s project, Austin’s fidelity requirement was born of a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived. The book also provides evidence of just how fruitful an epistemology is to be had, once we take that critique to heart and do epistemology as Austin thought it should be done.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41464,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-08-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10039\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10039","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Précis of Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method
Austin wrote as if what we say as epistemologists needs to accord faithfully with what we say, and are committed to saying, in ordinary life. The consensus has long been that Austin wrote this way because he simply didn’t understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. Austin’s Way with Skepticism explains why the consensus is mistaken. The book shows that, far from reflecting a failure on Austin’s part to understand the epistemologist’s project, Austin’s fidelity requirement was born of a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived. The book also provides evidence of just how fruitful an epistemology is to be had, once we take that critique to heart and do epistemology as Austin thought it should be done.
期刊介绍:
As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.