杰弗里斯-林德利悖论的历史和本质

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Alexander Ly
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引用次数: 13

摘要

Jeffreys–Lindley悖论暴露了贝叶斯和频率论假设检验之间的裂痕,这是统计推断的核心。与大多数现有文献所表明的相反,这个悖论是哈罗德·杰弗里斯爵士在20世纪30年代末开发的贝叶斯测试方法的核心。Jeffreys证明了零点假设({\mathcal{H}}_0)的证据与({\sqrt{n}\)成比例,并反复辩称,因此,将拒绝({\ mathcal{H}}_0\)的阈值设置为标准误差的常数倍是错误的。在这里,我们总结了杰弗里斯关于悖论的早期工作,并澄清了他包含\(\sqrt{n}\)术语的原因。先验分布被认为起着至关重要的作用;通过隐式校正选择,小参数值在\({\mathcal{H}}_1\)下被识别为相对令人惊讶。我们通过呈现完全频繁论者和完全贝叶斯版本来强调悖论的一般性质。我们还证明了悖论并不取决于像人们普遍认为的那样,将先前的质量分配给点假设。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

History and nature of the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox

History and nature of the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox

The Jeffreys–Lindley paradox exposes a rift between Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing that strikes at the heart of statistical inference. Contrary to what most current literature suggests, the paradox was central to the Bayesian testing methodology developed by Sir Harold Jeffreys in the late 1930s. Jeffreys showed that the evidence for a point-null hypothesis \({\mathcal {H}}_0\) scales with \(\sqrt{n}\) and repeatedly argued that it would, therefore, be mistaken to set a threshold for rejecting \({\mathcal {H}}_0\) at a constant multiple of the standard error. Here, we summarize Jeffreys’s early work on the paradox and clarify his reasons for including the \(\sqrt{n}\) term. The prior distribution is seen to play a crucial role; by implicitly correcting for selection, small parameter values are identified as relatively surprising under \({\mathcal {H}}_1\). We highlight the general nature of the paradox by presenting both a fully frequentist and a fully Bayesian version. We also demonstrate that the paradox does not depend on assigning prior mass to a point hypothesis, as is commonly believed.

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来源期刊
Archive for History of Exact Sciences
Archive for History of Exact Sciences 管理科学-科学史与科学哲学
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
20.00%
发文量
16
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: The Archive for History of Exact Sciences casts light upon the conceptual groundwork of the sciences by analyzing the historical course of rigorous quantitative thought and the precise theory of nature in the fields of mathematics, physics, technical chemistry, computer science, astronomy, and the biological sciences, embracing as well their connections to experiment. This journal nourishes historical research meeting the standards of the mathematical sciences. Its aim is to give rapid and full publication to writings of exceptional depth, scope, and permanence.
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