{"title":"为什么更大不更强?审计群体与审计质量","authors":"Shengnan Li , Feng Liu , Fan Ye , Michael D. Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107099","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines how the existence of auditor groups in accounting firms affects audit quality, using the unique regulatory and institutional settings of China. We define the auditor group as a cohort of exclusively and mutually cooperative and risk-sharing auditors who co-sign audit reports. Using hand-collected data on individual auditors and audit firms from 2010 to 2013, we identify 1,873 auditor groups and find that large auditor groups provide higher audit quality, measured as the propensity to issue qualified audit opinions. We show that audit quality varies among different auditor groups within audit firms. These findings indicate that the auditor group, rather than the audit firm or office, is the core decision-making and responsibility unit in the market for audit services in China. Our paper speaks to the literature on China’s bigger and stronger policy from a novel perspective of auditor groups inside the audit firm, and points out the importance of considering the internal structure of audit firms to better understand the relationship between audit firm size and audit quality, as suggested in <span>DeAngelo (1981)</span>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why bigger is not stronger? A perspective on auditor groups and audit quality\",\"authors\":\"Shengnan Li , Feng Liu , Fan Ye , Michael D. Yu\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107099\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This paper examines how the existence of auditor groups in accounting firms affects audit quality, using the unique regulatory and institutional settings of China. We define the auditor group as a cohort of exclusively and mutually cooperative and risk-sharing auditors who co-sign audit reports. Using hand-collected data on individual auditors and audit firms from 2010 to 2013, we identify 1,873 auditor groups and find that large auditor groups provide higher audit quality, measured as the propensity to issue qualified audit opinions. We show that audit quality varies among different auditor groups within audit firms. These findings indicate that the auditor group, rather than the audit firm or office, is the core decision-making and responsibility unit in the market for audit services in China. Our paper speaks to the literature on China’s bigger and stronger policy from a novel perspective of auditor groups inside the audit firm, and points out the importance of considering the internal structure of audit firms to better understand the relationship between audit firm size and audit quality, as suggested in <span>DeAngelo (1981)</span>.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48070,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425423000480\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425423000480","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Why bigger is not stronger? A perspective on auditor groups and audit quality
This paper examines how the existence of auditor groups in accounting firms affects audit quality, using the unique regulatory and institutional settings of China. We define the auditor group as a cohort of exclusively and mutually cooperative and risk-sharing auditors who co-sign audit reports. Using hand-collected data on individual auditors and audit firms from 2010 to 2013, we identify 1,873 auditor groups and find that large auditor groups provide higher audit quality, measured as the propensity to issue qualified audit opinions. We show that audit quality varies among different auditor groups within audit firms. These findings indicate that the auditor group, rather than the audit firm or office, is the core decision-making and responsibility unit in the market for audit services in China. Our paper speaks to the literature on China’s bigger and stronger policy from a novel perspective of auditor groups inside the audit firm, and points out the importance of considering the internal structure of audit firms to better understand the relationship between audit firm size and audit quality, as suggested in DeAngelo (1981).
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.