穆克吉论怀疑主义问题及其解决[Neo-Vedānta]

Pub Date : 2021-12-23 DOI:10.1163/22105700-bja10031
J. Garfield
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文考察了无名的现代印度哲学家穆克吉的作品,包括他的主要作品《自我、思想和现实》(1933)和《自我的本质》(1938)。Mukerji构建了一种怀疑论的挑战,这种挑战来自于早期现代欧洲、新黑格尔哲学、古典佛教和Vedānta的思想结合。穆克吉对怀疑主义的担忧很重要,部分原因是它们说明了印度哲学现代综合时期的许多创造性紧张关系,部分原因是它们真的很深刻,以有趣的方式预测了几十年后费耶阿本德提出的担忧。穆克吉认为,休谟、康德、新黑格尔主义和佛教哲学都未能提供对自我认识的充分解释,他利用这一发现进一步论证说,这些体系未能提供对更普遍的知识的适当解释。他对怀疑论的解决方案集中在对Śaṅkara的Vedānta的独特的现代解释上。
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A. C. Mukerji on the Problem of Skepticism and Its Resolution in Neo-Vedānta
This paper examines the work of the unsung modern Indian Philosopher A. C. Mukerji, in his major works Self, Thought and Reality (1933) and The Nature of Self (1938). Mukerji constructs a skeptical challenge that emerges from the union of ideas drawn from early modern Europe, neo-Hegelian philosophy, and classical Buddhism and Vedānta. Mukerji’s worries about skepticism are important in part because they illustrate many of the creative tensions within the modern, synthetic period of Indian philosophy, and in part because they are truly profound, anticipating in interesting ways the worries that Feyerabend was to raise a few decades later. Arguing that Humean, Kantian, neo-Hegelian, and Buddhist philosophy each fail to provide an adequate account of self-knowledge, Mukerji leverages this finding to further argue that these systems fail to offer a proper account of knowledge more generally. His solution to skepticism centers on a distinctively modern interpretation of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta.
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