VII. More Sensors Than Sense

The US Air Force likes to describe the future of command and control in warfare as analogous to Uber. Such a system promises a drastic improvement in efficiency and cooperation across the force. Suppose, for example, that an infantry platoon needed assistance in engaging enemy armour advancing on their position. They could make the request by reporting the target’s position, and this could be made available to all potential shooters in the area. These might comprise an artillery battery, an aircraft en route to a target and an aircraft returning from a strike. One could envisage the artillery battery declining the request because they were tasked with counterbattery duties and did not want to unmask their guns. The first aircraft might also decline because they were already tasked with an important strike mission and needed their munitions for that. The returning aircraft, finding that it had munitions left over from the strike, might accept, and the request would no longer be pushed to other units. Alternatively, if the second aircraft is removed from the equation, a higher commander might be envisaged, with access to the options, determining the trade-off between unmasking the guns, or abandoning the strike mission, based on their broader intent. Without such a system, the infantry platoon would have to call for artillery and air support on separate systems. Since the artillery and aircraft would not coordinate with each other, the infantry may receive no support, or support from both.