类比论证与权衡理由

IF 0.9 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Informal Logic Pub Date : 2022-12-13 DOI:10.22329/il.v42i4.7143

José Alhambra

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引用次数: 1

摘要

约翰·伍兹（John Woods）和布伦特·胡达克（Brent Hudak）的类比论证理论（1989），尽管其元论证方法是正确的，但当我们考虑权衡原因的可能性时，会产生问题。我认为，这是通过类比推理来解释论证中论点的前提和结论之间关系的结果。这里提出了根据理由进行解释。基于理由的方法解决了这些问题，并允许将理论扩展到通过类比来解释论证的特定变体，其中比较的主题不是论据，而是对理由的衡量。

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Argumentation by Analogy and Weighing of Reasons

John Woods and Brent Hudak’s theory on arguments by analogy (1989), although correct in its meta-argumentative approach, gives rise to problems when we consider the possibility of weighing reasons. I contend that this is an outcome of construing the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of arguments compared in argumentation by analogy as inferences. An interpretation in terms of reasons is proposed here. The reasons-based approach solves these problems and allows the theory to be extended to account for a particular variant of argumentation by analogy in which the subjects of comparison are not arguments, but weighings of reasons.

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来源期刊

Informal Logic PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

12 weeks

期刊介绍： Informal Logic publishes articles that advance the dialectic in reasoning and argumentation theory and practice. Primary criteria for the acceptance of articles with a theoretical focus or interest are: (1) the article advances the dialectic or constitutes an interesting comment on it: it presents a cogent argument, objection, interpretation or position that is an advance in relation to the background of issues and controversies on the topic; or it casts the issue addressed in a new and worthwhile light; and (2) the article makes explicit reference to the pertinent literature on its topic, and it discharges the burden of proof imposed by that scholarship. Primary criteria for acceptance of articles devoted to the teaching of informal logic, critical thinking or argumentation include: originality; utility; timeliness; and evidence of the effectiveness of the methods, materials, technologies, etc., proposed. The standard criteria for scholarly publication—topical fit with the subjects covered in the journal; adequacy of coverage to the issue addressed; clarity, organization and literateness of the prose; conceptual clarity and cogency of argumentation—apply ceteris paribus to the selection of all articles, notes and reviews.