{"title":"微芯片和运动鞋:双边贸易、权力转移和国家间冲突","authors":"Yuleng Zeng","doi":"10.1177/00223433231153902","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Strong commercial ties promote peace as states shun the opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, trade also enriches and empowers states, rendering them more capable of enforcing long-term settlements. Given economic disruption does not last forever, countries can be incentivized to trade short-term economic losses for long-term political or territorial gains. This trade-off can restrict or even reverse the pacifying effect of commerce as it renders states incapable of committing to existing peaceful deals. I argue the scope condition hinges on the existing power imbalance and the security externalities of trade, defined as states' abilities to translate trade gains into (potential) military power. For countries where the existing power gap is not extreme, the impact of bilateral strategic trade is contingent upon a country's trade externality relative to its opponent's. Although increased bilateral trade can be peace-promoting when the relative externality is small, the pacifying effects can dissipate as a relatively weaker state becomes more capable of exploiting trade gains. Building on recent work in network analysis, I propose a new measurement of trade externalities to test the above theory and find supporting results.</p>","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11324387/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Microchips and sneakers: Bilateral trade, shifting power, and interstate conflict.\",\"authors\":\"Yuleng Zeng\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/00223433231153902\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Strong commercial ties promote peace as states shun the opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, trade also enriches and empowers states, rendering them more capable of enforcing long-term settlements. Given economic disruption does not last forever, countries can be incentivized to trade short-term economic losses for long-term political or territorial gains. This trade-off can restrict or even reverse the pacifying effect of commerce as it renders states incapable of committing to existing peaceful deals. I argue the scope condition hinges on the existing power imbalance and the security externalities of trade, defined as states' abilities to translate trade gains into (potential) military power. For countries where the existing power gap is not extreme, the impact of bilateral strategic trade is contingent upon a country's trade externality relative to its opponent's. Although increased bilateral trade can be peace-promoting when the relative externality is small, the pacifying effects can dissipate as a relatively weaker state becomes more capable of exploiting trade gains. Building on recent work in network analysis, I propose a new measurement of trade externalities to test the above theory and find supporting results.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48324,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Peace Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11324387/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Peace Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231153902\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2023/4/16 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Peace Research","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231153902","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2023/4/16 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Microchips and sneakers: Bilateral trade, shifting power, and interstate conflict.
Strong commercial ties promote peace as states shun the opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, trade also enriches and empowers states, rendering them more capable of enforcing long-term settlements. Given economic disruption does not last forever, countries can be incentivized to trade short-term economic losses for long-term political or territorial gains. This trade-off can restrict or even reverse the pacifying effect of commerce as it renders states incapable of committing to existing peaceful deals. I argue the scope condition hinges on the existing power imbalance and the security externalities of trade, defined as states' abilities to translate trade gains into (potential) military power. For countries where the existing power gap is not extreme, the impact of bilateral strategic trade is contingent upon a country's trade externality relative to its opponent's. Although increased bilateral trade can be peace-promoting when the relative externality is small, the pacifying effects can dissipate as a relatively weaker state becomes more capable of exploiting trade gains. Building on recent work in network analysis, I propose a new measurement of trade externalities to test the above theory and find supporting results.
期刊介绍:
Journal of Peace Research is an interdisciplinary and international peer reviewed bimonthly journal of scholarly work in peace research. Edited at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), by an international editorial committee, Journal of Peace Research strives for a global focus on conflict and peacemaking. From its establishment in 1964, authors from over 50 countries have published in JPR. The Journal encourages a wide conception of peace, but focuses on the causes of violence and conflict resolution. Without sacrificing the requirements for theoretical rigour and methodological sophistication, articles directed towards ways and means of peace are favoured.