Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to Moral Law by Christopher J. Insole (review)

and the concepts that “give this synthesis unity” (A 79/B 104). Laywine’s claim that a reason is needed for thinking that “the space and time of” distinct perceptions “are somehow related” (242) is puzzling in light of Kant’s insistence in the Transcendental Aesthetic on the singularity and what we could call connectedness of space and time, which Laywine seems to discount with her later clarification that the unity ascribed to them in the Aesthetic is “just whatever makes any determinate . . . magnitude a continuous one” (254). But even if these or other details have more proximate sources or explanations, Laywine’s appeal to Kant’s cosmology and the development of his metaphysics powerfully illuminates the Transcendental Deduction as a whole. K a t h e r i n e D u n l o p University of Texas at Austin