一类Nash讨价还价对策的Kantian均衡

IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Atakan Dizarlar, Emin Karagözoğlu
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们研究了一个n$ n$参与人议价博弈的康德均衡,这是一个著名的分一美元博弈的改进版本。我们首先证明,康德均衡存在于相当最小的假设条件下。其次,如果所用的破产规则满足平等对待平等者,并且几乎没有任何比例,那么在任何康德均衡中,只有平等分配才能占上风。另一方面,我们证明了只有在比例规则下才会出现“任意”类型的结果。最后,利用我们以一种新颖的方式构造的混合破产规则,我们可以描述整个均衡集。我们的结果突出了制度之间的相互作用(划分规则的公理化性质)和代理人的均衡行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games

We study Kantian equilibria of an n $n$ -player bargaining game, which is a modified version of the well-known divide-the-dollar game. We first show that the Kantian equilibrium exists under fairly minimal assumptions. Second, if the bankruptcy rule used satisfies equal treatment of equals, and is almost nowhere proportional, then only equal division can prevail in any Kantian equilibrium. On the other hand, we show that an “anything goes” type result emerges only under the proportional rule. Finally, using hybrid bankruptcy rules that we construct in a novel fashion, we can characterize the whole equilibrium set. Our results highlight the interactions between institutions (axiomatic properties of division rules) and agents' equilibrium behavior.

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来源期刊
自引率
36.40%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.
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