卡车运输公司如何应对宣布的和未宣布的安全打击?政府突击检查的案例

IF 11.2 2区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT
Andrew Balthrop, Alex Scott, Jason Miller
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引用次数: 1

摘要

确保汽车运输公司遵守安全规则对供应链的有效运作和驾驶公众的安全至关重要。然而,对于航空公司如何应对运输部检查(又称“打击”)可能性的变化,人们知之甚少。根据法规遵从性和犯罪学文献,我们扩展了作为载体安全研究基础的理性骗子解释,结合了基于注意的理论的原则,设计了关于载体如何应对事先通知的检查和未事先通知的检查打击的新的理论预测。为了检验我们的理论,我们依赖于外生的检查概率的变化,这些变化来自于DOT使用的宣布和不宣布的检查“闪电战”。我们使用2012年至2016年近1000万辆卡车检查的纵向数据集来测试预测。我们发现,合规成本较低的公司和避免检查成本较高的公司在宣布的突击检查之前和期间提高了合规水平。规避成本较低的小公司倾向于避免公开的闪电战。未经宣布的闪电战不会导致依从性或规避的变化,这提供了证据,证明意识正在推动我们的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How do trucking companies respond to announced versus unannounced safety crackdowns? The case of government inspection blitzes

Ensuring motor carriers comply with safety rules is critical to the efficient workings of supply chains and the safety of the motoring public. However, little is understood regarding how carriers respond to changes in the likelihood of inspection (a.k.a., “crackdowns”) undertaken by the Department of Transportation. Drawing on the regulatory compliance and criminology literature, we extend the rational cheater explanation that undergirds carrier safety research by incorporating principles from attention-based theory to devise new theoretical predictions regarding how carriers respond to announced versus unannounced inspection crackdowns. To test our theory, we rely on exogenous variation in the probability of inspection from the DOT's use of announced and unannounced inspection “blitzes.” We test predictions using a longitudinal dataset of nearly 10 million truck inspections from 2012 to 2016. We find firms with lower costs of compliance, and higher costs of avoiding inspections improve compliance prior to and during announced blitzes. Small firms with lower costs of avoidance tend to avoid announced blitzes. Unannounced blitzes result in no changes in compliance or avoidance, providing evidence that awareness is driving our results.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.40
自引率
14.60%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Supply chain management and logistics processes play a crucial role in the success of businesses, both in terms of operations, strategy, and finances. To gain a deep understanding of these processes, it is essential to explore academic literature such as The Journal of Business Logistics. This journal serves as a scholarly platform for sharing original ideas, research findings, and effective strategies in the field of logistics and supply chain management. By providing innovative insights and research-driven knowledge, it equips organizations with the necessary tools to navigate the ever-changing business environment.
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