Miguel Casares, Luca G. Deidda, Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez
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There are two opposing welfare effects of market power in a model with monopolistic competition, loan defaults and moral hazard. The loss of output produced if firms set a higher mark-up over marginal costs confronts with some gain due to higher expected profits and the reduction of defaults. Such tradeoff results in an optimal level of market power that decreases with the efficiency of liquidation following default on a loan. If moral hazard is pervasive, credit rationing cuts down the default rates and mitigates the welfare cost of financial frictions.
期刊介绍:
Published since 1962, (formerly Western Economic Journal), EI is widely regarded as one of the top scholarly journals in its field. Besides containing research on all economics topic areas, a principal objective is to make each article understandable to economists who are not necessarily specialists in the article topic area. Nine Nobel laureates are among EI long list of prestigious authors.