多数人认可的社会选择

IF 2.2 4区心理学 Q2 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS

Journal of Mathematical Psychology Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jmp.2022.102694

Guy Barokas

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引用次数: 3

摘要

本论明理地提出了一种称为多数同意的社会选择规则，当后者是决定性的(即不包含顶部循环)时，它与简单多数规则一致，否则与顶部循环集上定义的批准投票(Brams和Fishburn, 1978)一致。我们将我们的规则与其他优先考虑偏好信息而不是批准信息的社会选择规则进行比较，并表明它因其吸引人的属性而脱颖而出。此外，我们为满足帕累托准则的多数批准版本提供了公理化。

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Majority-approval social choice

This note axiomatically proposes a social choice rule called majority approval, which coincides with the simple majority rule when the latter is decisive (i.e., contains no top cycles), and otherwise coincides with approval voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1978) defined on the top cycle set. We compare our rule to other social choice rules that prioritize preference information over approval information, and show that it stands out for its appealing properties. In addition, we provide axiomatization for a version of majority approval that satisfies the Pareto criterion.

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来源期刊

Journal of Mathematical Psychology 医学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

3.70

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

20.2 weeks

期刊介绍： The Journal of Mathematical Psychology includes articles, monographs and reviews, notes and commentaries, and book reviews in all areas of mathematical psychology. Empirical and theoretical contributions are equally welcome. Areas of special interest include, but are not limited to, fundamental measurement and psychological process models, such as those based upon neural network or information processing concepts. A partial listing of substantive areas covered include sensation and perception, psychophysics, learning and memory, problem solving, judgment and decision-making, and motivation. The Journal of Mathematical Psychology is affiliated with the Society for Mathematical Psychology. Research Areas include: • Models for sensation and perception, learning, memory and thinking • Fundamental measurement and scaling • Decision making • Neural modeling and networks • Psychophysics and signal detection • Neuropsychological theories • Psycholinguistics • Motivational dynamics • Animal behavior • Psychometric theory