作为过程的主体性

IF 0.5 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
James R. Mensch
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引用次数: 0

摘要

胡塞尔在他晚期的手稿中,对这个主题做出了一些明显相反的断言。一旦我们意识到它们适用于主题起源的不同阶段,这些断言就会得到调和。这意味着主体必须被理解为一个过程,即从构成其核心的活的当下到我们每个人都是发达的自我。因此,主体不能与其起源的任何特定阶段相一致。必须相应地理解其形成的基因解释。这并不是一个详细描述我们逐渐获得的特征,这些特征仍然是我们自我的“沉积层”。相反,这些层,就像它们形成的自我一样,作为正在进行的过程、运动的一部分而存在,这就是我们的主体性。我认为,这种观点是胡塞尔对我们自我本质的最后一次洞察,尽管尚未发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Subjectivity Viewed as a Process
Husserl, in his late manuscripts, made a number of apparently opposing assertions regarding the subject. These assertions are reconciled once we realize that they apply to the different stages of the genesis of the subject. This means that the subject has to be understood as a process – i.e., as continually proceeding from the living present, which forms its core, to the developed self that each of us is. As such, the subject cannot be identified with any of the particular stages of its genesis. The genetic account of its becoming must be understood accordingly. It is not an account that details the progressive acquisition of features that remain as “sedimented layers” of our selfhood. Rather, such layers, like the selfhood they form, exist as part of the ongoing process, the motion, that is our subjectivity. This view, I argue, is Husserl’s final, if undeveloped, insight into the nature of our selfhood.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: Research in Phenomenology deals with phenomenological philosophy in a broad sense, including original phenomenological research, critical and interpretative studies of major phenomenological thinkers, studies relating phenomenological philosophy to other disciplines, and historical studies of special relevance to phenomenological philosophy.
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