Crisippo e l’ἐπελευστικὴ κίνησις: una tappa della polemica anti–accademica?

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to identify the upholders of the thesis reported by Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 23, aimed to reject Stoic determinism. A brief introduction will be devoted to the relationship between this text and the more general context of the Stoic philosophy. Then, I will take into account the objection against Stoic determinism raised by some anonymous philosophers: according to it, causal determinism would be inconsistent with the choice among indistinguishables. Chrysippus replied that if that choice were not determined, it would occur without causes; and this would be absurd. Then I will summarize the most likely hypotheses about the identification of Chrysippus’ opponents, and I will opt for Academics. Finally, I will try to conjecture the link between Plutarch’s passage and the debate among Stoics and Academics about indistinguishables, as we know it from other sources.