关于我们认识论自我概念的悖论：你是一个认识论的上级吗？

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-10-19 DOI:10.1163/22105700-bja10047

M. Walker

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我希望证明1、2和3都是合理的，但我们可以推导出4:1。在认识论上，我们可以相信在多命题争论中我们偏爱的观点是正确的，或者至少更有可能是正确的。2. 如果在认识论上允许我们相信我们在多命题争论中所偏好的观点是正确的，或者至少更有可能是正确的，那么在认识论上允许我们相信我们在多命题争论中比持不同意见的同事在认识论上更胜一筹。3.在多命题争论中，认为我们在认识上优于我们持不同意见的同事，这在认识论上是不允许的。4. 1、2或3中至少有一个为假。

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A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior?

I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: 1. It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not. 2. If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically permissible for us to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 3. It is not epistemically permissible to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 4. At least one of 1, 2, or 3, is false.

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来源期刊

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.