公平市场宪政:从新自由主义到民主自由主义经济治理

IF 1.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Rosalind Dixon
{"title":"公平市场宪政:从新自由主义到民主自由主义经济治理","authors":"Rosalind Dixon","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqac029","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Neo-liberalism was in crisis well before COVID-19; and COVID-19 has only further highlighted the gaps and fault lines in existing liberal democratic models. But this does not mean that we should walk away from liberal ideals, or the general idea of globalisation or market-based forms of ordering. Instead, we should seek a new, more ‘democratic’ or pro-social understanding of the liberal ideal, which emphasises the idea of fair rather over free markets. This idea of fair markets can be understood in numerous ways, but I suggest that it is best understood as entailing a commitment by the state to: (i) guaranteeing access to a public baseline of core goods, or access to a generous social minimum to all citizens, regardless of market outcomes; (ii) ensuring equality of access to certain ‘relative goods’; (iii) regulating market power or sources of monopoly power; and (iv) responding to or ‘internalising’ negative externalities or social costs associated with private market behaviour. The article explores what this entails for the design of constitutions, and especially constitutional property and social rights, and the scope and strength of judicial review. Ultimately, the article suggests, fair market constitutionalism points to the desirability of a combination of weak property and social rights—ie property rights that offer some but not complete protection for existing economic entitlements, coupled with legislative duties to implement fair market norms or limited weak social rights guarantees. But this does not mean that such guarantees can only be weakly enforced by courts: blockages in the democratic process may mean that courts can and should adopt a weak–strong—or responsive—approach to enforcing these fundamentally weak rights guarantees.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Fair Market Constitutionalism: From Neo-liberal to Democratic Liberal Economic Governance\",\"authors\":\"Rosalind Dixon\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/ojls/gqac029\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Neo-liberalism was in crisis well before COVID-19; and COVID-19 has only further highlighted the gaps and fault lines in existing liberal democratic models. But this does not mean that we should walk away from liberal ideals, or the general idea of globalisation or market-based forms of ordering. Instead, we should seek a new, more ‘democratic’ or pro-social understanding of the liberal ideal, which emphasises the idea of fair rather over free markets. This idea of fair markets can be understood in numerous ways, but I suggest that it is best understood as entailing a commitment by the state to: (i) guaranteeing access to a public baseline of core goods, or access to a generous social minimum to all citizens, regardless of market outcomes; (ii) ensuring equality of access to certain ‘relative goods’; (iii) regulating market power or sources of monopoly power; and (iv) responding to or ‘internalising’ negative externalities or social costs associated with private market behaviour. The article explores what this entails for the design of constitutions, and especially constitutional property and social rights, and the scope and strength of judicial review. Ultimately, the article suggests, fair market constitutionalism points to the desirability of a combination of weak property and social rights—ie property rights that offer some but not complete protection for existing economic entitlements, coupled with legislative duties to implement fair market norms or limited weak social rights guarantees. But this does not mean that such guarantees can only be weakly enforced by courts: blockages in the democratic process may mean that courts can and should adopt a weak–strong—or responsive—approach to enforcing these fundamentally weak rights guarantees.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47225,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqac029\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqac029","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

新自由主义早在新冠肺炎之前就已经陷入危机;新冠肺炎只会进一步凸显现有自由民主模式中的差距和断层线。但这并不意味着我们应该放弃自由主义理想,或全球化的总体理念或基于市场的秩序形式。相反,我们应该寻求对自由主义理想的新的、更“民主”或亲社会的理解,这种理想强调公平而非自由市场的理念。公平市场的概念可以用多种方式理解,但我认为,最好将其理解为国家承诺:(I)保证所有公民都能获得核心商品的公共基准,或获得慷慨的社会最低标准,无论市场结果如何;(ii)确保平等获得某些“相对商品”;(iii)规范市场力量或垄断力量的来源;以及(iv)应对或“内化”与私人市场行为相关的负外部性或社会成本。本文探讨了这对宪法的设计,特别是宪法财产和社会权利的设计,以及司法审查的范围和力度意味着什么。文章认为,最终,公平市场宪政指出了弱财产权和社会权利相结合的可取性,即为现有经济权利提供一些但不完全保护的财产权,加上实施公平市场规范或有限的弱社会权利保障的立法义务。但这并不意味着法院只能微弱地执行这些保障:民主进程中的障碍可能意味着法院可以也应该采取弱——强——或回应——的方法来执行这些根本薄弱的权利保障。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fair Market Constitutionalism: From Neo-liberal to Democratic Liberal Economic Governance
Neo-liberalism was in crisis well before COVID-19; and COVID-19 has only further highlighted the gaps and fault lines in existing liberal democratic models. But this does not mean that we should walk away from liberal ideals, or the general idea of globalisation or market-based forms of ordering. Instead, we should seek a new, more ‘democratic’ or pro-social understanding of the liberal ideal, which emphasises the idea of fair rather over free markets. This idea of fair markets can be understood in numerous ways, but I suggest that it is best understood as entailing a commitment by the state to: (i) guaranteeing access to a public baseline of core goods, or access to a generous social minimum to all citizens, regardless of market outcomes; (ii) ensuring equality of access to certain ‘relative goods’; (iii) regulating market power or sources of monopoly power; and (iv) responding to or ‘internalising’ negative externalities or social costs associated with private market behaviour. The article explores what this entails for the design of constitutions, and especially constitutional property and social rights, and the scope and strength of judicial review. Ultimately, the article suggests, fair market constitutionalism points to the desirability of a combination of weak property and social rights—ie property rights that offer some but not complete protection for existing economic entitlements, coupled with legislative duties to implement fair market norms or limited weak social rights guarantees. But this does not mean that such guarantees can only be weakly enforced by courts: blockages in the democratic process may mean that courts can and should adopt a weak–strong—or responsive—approach to enforcing these fundamentally weak rights guarantees.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
8.30%
发文量
31
期刊介绍: The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies is published on behalf of the Faculty of Law in the University of Oxford. It is designed to encourage interest in all matters relating to law, with an emphasis on matters of theory and on broad issues arising from the relationship of law to other disciplines. No topic of legal interest is excluded from consideration. In addition to traditional questions of legal interest, the following are all within the purview of the journal: comparative and international law, the law of the European Community, legal history and philosophy, and interdisciplinary material in areas of relevance.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信