On jamming detection methods for satellite Internet of Things networks

Despite the fast growth of machine‐type communications via satellite, the vulnerability of such networks to intentional interference and malicious jamming attacks is a raising concern. Specifically, in this paper, we address a class of jamming attacks in which the adversary uses the underlying knowledge of the satellite physical and access protocol to increase the jamming impact. In particular, we focused on a type of camouflage jamming attack (using publicly known preamble) to deceive the receiver, which rapidly leads to poor performance. Compared to conventional constant jamming attacks, these jamming strategies are known to be more effective and potentially more harmful to the targeted communication network. We analyze methods to detect such jamming attacks and provide examples of jamming detection techniques for the satellite Internet of Things (IoT) networks. Results indicate the effective performance of the jamming detection techniques for a variety of representative system parameters. More specifically, we introduce a simple (counting) jamming detection method along with numerical results for realistic system parameters, which confirms system design vulnerability as well as how the jammer may improve her strategy.