归纳风险:它真的反驳了价值自由吗?

IF 0.3 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
M. Dressel
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引用次数: 1

摘要

归纳风险的论点被认为是对无价值科学的最大挑战之一。它的很大一部分吸引力在于,即使是一个理想的认知主体——“完美的科学家”或“作为科学家的科学家”——也无法逃脱归纳的风险。在本文中,我通过规定一个理想化的贝叶斯决策设置来审视这一雄心。我认为归纳风险并不表明“完美的科学家”必须,描述性地说,做出非认识论的价值判断,至少不会以一种破坏价值自由理想的方式。然而,这一论点更成功地表明,在某些情况下,“完美的科学家”应该,从规范上讲,使用非认识论的价值观。我还表明,这是可能的,而不会产生非法处方和一厢情愿的想法的问题。因此,虽然归纳风险并没有完全否定价值自由,但它仍然代表了对价值自由科学的有力批判。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Inductive risk: does it really refute value-freedom?
The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that undermines the value-free ideal. However, the argument is more successful in showing that there are cases where the “perfect scientist” should, normatively speaking, use non-epistemic values. I also show that this is possible without creating problems of illegitimate prescription and wishful thinking. Thus, while inductive risk does not refute value-freedom completely, it still represents a powerful critique of value-free science.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
65
期刊介绍: Since its foundation in 1935, Theoria publishes research in all areas of philosophy. Theoria is committed to precision and clarity in philosophical discussions, and encourages cooperation between philosophy and other disciplines. The journal is not affiliated with any particular school or faction. Instead, it promotes dialogues between different philosophical viewpoints. Theoria is peer-reviewed. It publishes articles, reviews, and shorter notes and discussions. Short discussion notes on recent articles in Theoria are welcome.
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