{"title":"“人民想要它”","authors":"H. Jansen","doi":"10.1075/jaic.17028.jan","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n This article reflects on the reasonableness of populist arguments supporting a prescriptive standpoint in the context of\n deliberation (which I call ‘deliberative’ populist arguments). A literature survey shows a divide between authors who claim that populist\n arguments are always fallacious and those who think that in some situations they can be reasonable, including the context of political\n deliberation. It is then argued that deliberative populist arguments are based on a linking premise that appeals to majority opinion as a\n principle of democracy. This linking premise differs from the one underlying the traditional interpretation of a fallacious populist\n argument (argumentum ad populum) and appears at first sight to make the argument reasonable. However, I conclude that a\n deliberative populist argument is also unreasonable, because it acts merely as a trump card, creating a false impression about democracy and\n avoiding engagement in real debate and substantive reasons.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"“The people want it”\",\"authors\":\"H. Jansen\",\"doi\":\"10.1075/jaic.17028.jan\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n This article reflects on the reasonableness of populist arguments supporting a prescriptive standpoint in the context of\\n deliberation (which I call ‘deliberative’ populist arguments). A literature survey shows a divide between authors who claim that populist\\n arguments are always fallacious and those who think that in some situations they can be reasonable, including the context of political\\n deliberation. It is then argued that deliberative populist arguments are based on a linking premise that appeals to majority opinion as a\\n principle of democracy. This linking premise differs from the one underlying the traditional interpretation of a fallacious populist\\n argument (argumentum ad populum) and appears at first sight to make the argument reasonable. However, I conclude that a\\n deliberative populist argument is also unreasonable, because it acts merely as a trump card, creating a false impression about democracy and\\n avoiding engagement in real debate and substantive reasons.\",\"PeriodicalId\":0,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.17028.jan\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.17028.jan","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
本文反思了民粹主义论点在审议背景下支持规定立场的合理性(我称之为“审议”民粹主义论点)。一项文献调查显示,声称民粹主义论点总是错误的作者和认为在某些情况下,包括在政治审议的背景下,这些论点是合理的作者之间存在分歧。然后有人认为,深思熟虑的民粹主义论点是基于一个联系的前提,这个前提作为民主原则吸引了大多数人的意见。这种联系的前提不同于传统上对谬误的民粹主义论点(argumentum ad populum)的解释,并且乍一看是为了使论点合理。然而,我的结论是,深思熟虑的民粹主义论点也是不合理的,因为它只是一张王牌,制造了对民主的错误印象,避免了参与真正的辩论和实质性的原因。
This article reflects on the reasonableness of populist arguments supporting a prescriptive standpoint in the context of
deliberation (which I call ‘deliberative’ populist arguments). A literature survey shows a divide between authors who claim that populist
arguments are always fallacious and those who think that in some situations they can be reasonable, including the context of political
deliberation. It is then argued that deliberative populist arguments are based on a linking premise that appeals to majority opinion as a
principle of democracy. This linking premise differs from the one underlying the traditional interpretation of a fallacious populist
argument (argumentum ad populum) and appears at first sight to make the argument reasonable. However, I conclude that a
deliberative populist argument is also unreasonable, because it acts merely as a trump card, creating a false impression about democracy and
avoiding engagement in real debate and substantive reasons.