用相对军事力量检验权力转移理论

Q2 Social Sciences
Charles J. Koch
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文使用二元对中的相对军事力量来检验权力转移理论。作者假设,当一对军事力量达到相对对等时,这两个国家很可能会发动战争。此外,当二元对不再保持相对的军事力量对等时,两国之间发生战争的可能性就会降低。尽管用于检验这一假设的样本群体很小(n=3),但混合方法分析表明支持权力转移理论。此外,与使用军事人员和国内生产总值盈余的结果相比,使用军事支出和国内生产盈余的结果更为实质性。当将军费开支和国内生产总值盈余与军费开支、军事人员和国内生产产值盈余的组合进行比较时,不存在统计学上的显著差异(p=.99)。这些结果表明,相对军事力量有可能为研究人员提供一个额外的量化指标来检验权力转移理论。尽管这些初步结果很有希望,但还需要进一步的研究来测试更大的二元样本群体。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Testing the Power Transition Theory with Relative Military Power
This article tests the power transition theory using relative military power within a dyad pair. The author hypothesizes that when a dyad pair achieves relative military power parity, the two states are likely to initiate war. Furthermore, when a dyad pair no longer maintains relative military power parity, the probability of war between the two states decreases. Although the sample population used to test this hypothesis is small (n=3), the mixed-method analysis indicates support to the power transition theory. Furthermore, results are more substantial when using military expenditure and surplus domestic when compared to results using military personnel and surplus domestic product. No statistically significant difference exists (p=.99) when comparing military expenditure and surplus domestic product with a combination of military expenditure, military personnel, and surplus domestic product. These results indicate that relative military power possesses the potential to provide researchers an additional quantitative measure to test the power transition theory. Although these initial results are promising, further research is required to test a larger sample population of dyads.
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来源期刊
Journal of Strategic Security
Journal of Strategic Security Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
26
审稿时长
12 weeks
期刊介绍: The Journal of Strategic Security (JSS) is a double-blind peer-reviewed professional journal published quarterly by Henley-Putnam School of Strategic Security with support from the University of South Florida Libraries. The Journal provides a multi-disciplinary forum for scholarship and discussion of strategic security issues drawing from the fields of global security, international relations, intelligence, terrorism and counterterrorism studies, among others. JSS is indexed in SCOPUS, the Directory of Open Access Journals, and several EBSCOhost and ProQuest databases.
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