{"title":"国内游说外部变革:纺织行业和巴基斯坦进入普遍优惠制+","authors":"S. Munir","doi":"10.1177/00219096231192314","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How do export-oriented factions influence trade policy? Export-oriented industries have incentives to expand trade, as doing so results in greater market access and higher profits. To achieve higher trade, such industries lobby policymakers through associations and interest groups that vie for policy influence. This paper suggests that such organization allows exporters to lobby governments at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, exporters can take vocal positions on policy and pressure the government into concessions. Externally, exporters can placate opposition to their proposals by engaging in diplomacy and negotiation to finalize agreements. This paper uses Pakistan’s quest for Generalised System of Preferences Plus status with the European Union (EU) as an illustration of this mechanism. Influential domestic factions in Pakistan’s textile sector stood to benefit from preferential trading with the EU, and they successfully lobbied for favorable change in the country’s domestic policy and external relations. Evidence for this argument is presented using archival newspaper research from 2009 to 2013.","PeriodicalId":46881,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Asian and African Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Domestic Lobbying for External Change: Textile Sector and Pakistan’s Entry into Generalised System of Preferences Plus\",\"authors\":\"S. Munir\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/00219096231192314\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"How do export-oriented factions influence trade policy? Export-oriented industries have incentives to expand trade, as doing so results in greater market access and higher profits. To achieve higher trade, such industries lobby policymakers through associations and interest groups that vie for policy influence. This paper suggests that such organization allows exporters to lobby governments at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, exporters can take vocal positions on policy and pressure the government into concessions. Externally, exporters can placate opposition to their proposals by engaging in diplomacy and negotiation to finalize agreements. This paper uses Pakistan’s quest for Generalised System of Preferences Plus status with the European Union (EU) as an illustration of this mechanism. Influential domestic factions in Pakistan’s textile sector stood to benefit from preferential trading with the EU, and they successfully lobbied for favorable change in the country’s domestic policy and external relations. Evidence for this argument is presented using archival newspaper research from 2009 to 2013.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46881,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Asian and African Studies\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-08-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Asian and African Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096231192314\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"AREA STUDIES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Asian and African Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096231192314","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
Domestic Lobbying for External Change: Textile Sector and Pakistan’s Entry into Generalised System of Preferences Plus
How do export-oriented factions influence trade policy? Export-oriented industries have incentives to expand trade, as doing so results in greater market access and higher profits. To achieve higher trade, such industries lobby policymakers through associations and interest groups that vie for policy influence. This paper suggests that such organization allows exporters to lobby governments at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, exporters can take vocal positions on policy and pressure the government into concessions. Externally, exporters can placate opposition to their proposals by engaging in diplomacy and negotiation to finalize agreements. This paper uses Pakistan’s quest for Generalised System of Preferences Plus status with the European Union (EU) as an illustration of this mechanism. Influential domestic factions in Pakistan’s textile sector stood to benefit from preferential trading with the EU, and they successfully lobbied for favorable change in the country’s domestic policy and external relations. Evidence for this argument is presented using archival newspaper research from 2009 to 2013.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Asian and African Studies (JAAS) was founded in 1965 to further research and study on Asia and Africa. JAAS is a peer reviewed journal of area studies recognised for consistent scholarly contributions to cutting-edge issues and debates. The journal welcomes articles, research notes, and book reviews that focus on the dynamics of global change and development of Asian and African nations, societies, cultures, and the global community. Published articles cover: -development and change -technology and communication -globalization -public administration -politics -economy -education -health, wealth, and welfare -poverty and growth -humanities -sociology -political science -linguistics -economics JAAS adheres to a double-blind reviewing policy in which the identity of both the reviewer and author are always concealed from both parties. Decisions on manuscripts will be taken as rapidly as possible. However, while it is hoped that a decision can be made in 6-8 weeks, the refereeing process makes it impossible to predict the length of time that will be required to process any given manuscript.