反观念主义与认识和信仰的对象

IF 0.3 N/A PHILOSOPHY
M. Lievers
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引用次数: 0

摘要

迈克尔·艾尔斯的《知与见:新经验主义的基础》是对两种思想的丰富而详细的发展。首先,感知以一种清晰明了的方式直接向我们呈现现实。因此,我们获得了世界的基本知识:“通过明显、自觉地与知识对象进行直接的认知接触而获得的知识。”(Ayers 2019,63)第二种观点是,感知中不需要概念。在这篇文章中,作者考察了艾尔斯的观点。在第一节中,作者确定了艾尔斯攻击的对象——概念主义。然后,他描述了为什么许多哲学家认为这种概念主义观点很有吸引力。在下一节中,他讨论了艾尔斯对概念主义的批评,试图将这些批评与作者在下一部分中讨论的他积极观点的陈述区分开来。最后,他描述了艾尔斯积极立场的一些问题,他认为这些问题是他强烈反对概念主义的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Anti-Conceptualism and the Objects of Knowledge and Belief
Michael Ayers’s Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism is a rich and detailed development of two ideas. The first is that perception presents reality to us directly in a perspicuous way. We thus acquire primary knowledge of the world: “knowledge gained by being evidently, self-consciously, in direct cognitive contact with the object of the knowledge.” (Ayers 2019, 63) The second idea is that concepts are not needed in perception. In this article, the author examines Ayers’s view. The author proceeds as follows: In the first section, he identifies the target of Ayers’s attacks, conceptualism. He then describes why many philosophers have felt this conceptualist view to be attractive. In the next section, he discusses Ayers’s criticisms of conceptualism in an attempt to disentangle these criticisms from the statement of his positive view, which the author discusses in the following section. He ends by describing some problems for Ayers’s positive position that are, so he argues, the result of his vehement opposition to conceptualism.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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