公开招标中供应商排序颠倒的选择

IF 6.8 2区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT
Fredo Schotanus , Gijsbert van den Engh , Yoran Nijenhuis , Jan Telgen
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引用次数: 6

摘要

对于公共部门的供应商选择,通常将加权和模型与允许排名反转的相对评分方法结合使用。在排名反转中,我们指的是在删除或添加一个未赢得原始投标的非最优投标后,在投标排名中改变顺序,导致新的获胜者。在实践中,从业者表示使用允许等级反转的方法的一个重要原因是它在实践中很少发生。基于对303份荷兰公开招标的分析,这项研究表明,事实并非如此。在大约五分之一的投标中,在向没有质量门槛的投标中添加非最优虚构投标后,排名反转发生。在去除出价后,如果使用曲线相对评分方法,则比率约为1 / 40。此外,研究表明,当(i)没有质量门槛,(ii)投标数量增加,(iii)投标价格差异增加,以及(iv)价格权重不是很低或很高时,排名反转率增加。我们认为,允许排名反转的相对评分方法不应用于公共采购,或者仅在例外情况下使用,因为它与公共采购原则相冲突,并导致总体投标价值降低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Supplier selection with rank reversal in public tenders

For supplier selection in the public sector, the Weighted Sum Model is often used in combination with relative scoring methods that allow rank reversal. With rank reversal we refer to a changed order in the ranking of bids leading to a new winner, after removing or adding a non-optimal bid that does not win the original tender. In practice, an important reason indicated by practitioners for using methods that allow rank reversal is that it would rarely occur in practice. Based on an analysis of 303 Dutch public tenders, this research shows this is not true. In about 1 out of 5 the tenders, rank reversal occurs after adding non-optimal fictional bids to tenders that do not have quality thresholds. After removing bids, the rate is about 1 out of 40 if a curved relative scoring method is used. In addition, the research shows that rank reversal rates increase when (i) there is no quality threshold, (ii) the number of bids increases, (iii) bid price variance increases, and (iv) price weights are not very low or high. We argue that relative scoring methods that allow rank reversal should not be used in public procurement, or otherwise only in exceptional cases, as it conflicts with public procurement principles and leads to reduced overall bid value.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
18.00%
发文量
31
审稿时长
70 days
期刊介绍: The mission of the Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management is to publish original, high-quality research within the field of purchasing and supply management (PSM). Articles should have a significant impact on PSM theory and practice. The Journal ensures that high quality research is collected and disseminated widely to both academics and practitioners, and provides a forum for debate. It covers all subjects relating to the purchase and supply of goods and services in industry, commerce, local, national, and regional government, health and transportation.
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