研究生院选择中的距离与不匹配

IF 1.2 Q3 Social Sciences

Education Economics Pub Date : 2022-02-22 DOI:10.1080/09645292.2022.2042203

J. Ashworth, Michael Olabisi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们使用375,000名美国GMAT®考生的成绩报告来记录学生能力与学校质量之间不匹配的模式。我们发现，考生在选择MBA课程以发送分数，进而扩展到申请时，存在很大程度的不匹配。有证据表明，考生在选择学校时的高度不匹配可以解释一些归因于学校政策的学术不匹配。使用离散选择模型，我们发现候选人因距离而气馁，而受到州内项目的激励。我们还发现，申请者对高质量课程的偏好可以解释大部分申请的超匹配。

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Distance and mismatch in graduate school selection

ABSTRACT We use the score reports of 375,000 US-based GMAT® test takers to document patterns of mismatch between student ability and school quality. We find substantial levels of mismatch in candidates' selection of MBA programs for score-sending, and by extension, applications. The evidence suggests that the high levels of mismatch in the selection of schools by candidates can explain some of the academic mismatch attributed to school policies. Using discrete choice models, we find candidates are discouraged by distance and motivated by in-state programs. We also find that much of the application overmatch is explained by candidates' preference for high-quality programs.

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来源期刊

Education Economics EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH-

CiteScore

2.00

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： Education Economics is a peer-reviewed journal serving as a forum for debate in all areas of the economics and management of education. Particular emphasis is given to the "quantitative" aspects of educational management which involve numerate disciplines such as economics and operational research. The content is of international appeal and is not limited to material of a technical nature. Applied work with clear policy implications is especially encouraged. Readership of the journal includes academics in the field of education, economics and management; civil servants and local government officials responsible for education and manpower planning; educational managers at the level of the individual school or college.