欧洲银行业的共同所有权模式——金融危机的影响1

IF 1.3 4区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Albert Banal-Estañol, Nuria Boot, J. Seldeslachts
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们提供了2003-2005年期间欧洲前25大银行的所有权模式描述,我们特别关注全球金融危机。投资经理,如贝莱德,在不同银行的大宗资产数量方面占主导地位,在整个样本中保持着相当稳定的“共同所有制”网络。然而,金融危机导致政府向几家陷入困境的银行注资,这反过来又导致政府的持股量激增,而政府通常是“非共同所有人”(即,他们只持有一家银行的股份)。这一跳跃转化为这些投资者暂时成为持有大量股份的顶级投资者,而非普通股所有者在大股东中占多数。与美国银行业的简短比较揭示了欧洲和美国银行业之间的巨大所有权差异。我们简要讨论了这些所有权模式对银行业的竞争、稳定性和绩效可能意味着什么。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Common Ownership Patterns in the European Banking Sector—The Impact of the Financial Crisis1
We provide a description of ownership patterns in the top 25 European banks for the period 2003–2015, where we especially focus on the global financial crisis. Investment managers, such as Blackrock, are dominant in terms of number of blockholdings in different banks, maintaining fairly stable “common ownership” networks throughout our sample. However, the financial crisis led to capital injections by governments in several banks in trouble, which in turn led to a jump in holdings by governments, which typically are “non-common owners” (i.e., they hold only shares in only one bank). This jump translated into these investors temporarily being the top investor with a large share, and non-common owners being the majority among large shareholders. A brief comparison with US banks uncovers large ownership differences between the European and US banking sectors. We briefly discuss what these ownership patterns might imply for competition, stability and performance in the banking industry.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
26.70%
发文量
16
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