卡普兰的怀疑论之道

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY
Michael Williams
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引用次数: 1

摘要

奥斯汀最近不怎么流行了。马克·卡普兰(Mark Kaplan)在《奥斯汀的怀疑论之路》(Austin’s Way with Skeptism)一书中逆流而上,认为奥斯汀在如何进行认识论方面还有很多东西要教给我们。在方法论上,奥斯汀坚持忠于普通的谈论知识的方式是对认识论理论的不可谈判的约束。从本质上讲,奥斯汀对知识有重要的看法。但是,尽管我完全符合卡普兰事业的精神,但我认为奥斯汀占据了一个更激进的立场:弄清语言事实应该会让我们对知识理论的概念提出质疑,至少在传统上,“知识理论”是被理解的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Kaplan’s Way with Skepticism
Austin is not much in fashion these days. In Austin’s Way with Skepticism, Mark Kaplan swims against the current, arguing that Austin still has much to teach us about how to do epistemology. Methodologically, Austin’s insistence on fidelity to ordinary ways of talking about knowledge is a non-negotiable constraint on epistemological theorizing. Substantively, Austin has important things to say about knowledge. But while I am fully in accord with the spirit of Kaplan’s enterprise, I take Austin to occupy a more radical position: that getting the linguistic facts straight should lead us to call into question the very idea of a theory of knowledge, at least as ‘theory of knowledge’ has traditionally been understood.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
期刊介绍: As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.
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