“非逻辑”论证的逻辑

IF 0.9 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Informal Logic Pub Date : 2022-09-07 DOI:10.22329/il.v42i3.7499

D. Godden

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在吉尔伯特的多模态论证理论中，“逻辑”只是许多论证模式中的一种，包括情感的、本能的(身体的)和本能的(直觉的)。然而，我认为，如果正确理解，逻辑不是众多模式中的一种。相反，它最好被理解为一种论证的超级模式。吉尔伯特所说的论证的“逻辑模式”——一种线性的、有序的、高度可语言化的论证方式——只有在某些推理空间的逻辑被清晰表达的情况下才有可能实现。多模态论证的“反逻辑”倾向并不存在于客体层面——它支持“非逻辑”的论证模式，而是存在于元层面——作为对“逻辑”模式的错误拥抱，它抵制使用控制不同模式的逻辑来自我调节我们的论证过程。

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Logics for “Non-Logical” Argumentation

On Gilbert’s multi-modal theory of argumentation, the “logical” is but one among many modes of argument, including the emotional, the visceral (physical), and the kisceral (intuitive). Yet, I argue that, properly understood, the logical is not one mode among many. Rather, it is better understood as the uber-mode of argument. What Gilbert calls the “logical mode” of argument—a linear, orderly, highly verbalizable, way of arguing—is made possible only to the extent that the logic of some space of reasons has been articulated. The “anti-logical” penchant of multi-modal argumentation is not found at the object-level—in its countenancing “non-logical” modes of argument, but at the meta-level—in its resistance, as a mistaken embracing of the “logical” mode, to using the logics governing the different modes to self-regulate the course of our arguings.

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来源期刊

Informal Logic PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

12 weeks

期刊介绍： Informal Logic publishes articles that advance the dialectic in reasoning and argumentation theory and practice. Primary criteria for the acceptance of articles with a theoretical focus or interest are: (1) the article advances the dialectic or constitutes an interesting comment on it: it presents a cogent argument, objection, interpretation or position that is an advance in relation to the background of issues and controversies on the topic; or it casts the issue addressed in a new and worthwhile light; and (2) the article makes explicit reference to the pertinent literature on its topic, and it discharges the burden of proof imposed by that scholarship. Primary criteria for acceptance of articles devoted to the teaching of informal logic, critical thinking or argumentation include: originality; utility; timeliness; and evidence of the effectiveness of the methods, materials, technologies, etc., proposed. The standard criteria for scholarly publication—topical fit with the subjects covered in the journal; adequacy of coverage to the issue addressed; clarity, organization and literateness of the prose; conceptual clarity and cogency of argumentation—apply ceteris paribus to the selection of all articles, notes and reviews.