{"title":"欧盟委员会何时追究违规行为?","authors":"Sivaram Cheruvu","doi":"10.1177/14651165221087635","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Under what conditions will international compliance-monitoring institutions pursue violations of international law? The European Commission’s infringement procedure is a multi-step process that culminates at the Court of Justice of the European Union when a member state has allegedly violated European Union law. The Commission, however, does not have meaningful enforcement powers, and may potentially spend valuable time and resources on a case only for a member state to not comply with European Union law. To manage this opportunity cost of pursuing other violations of European Union law, I argue that the Commission will strategically delay advancing a case through the infringement procedure when it anticipates that the political conditions will be more favorable for compliance in the future. I provide evidence that the Commission delays infringement proceedings when it expects the election of a new government that will be more likely to comply than the incumbent government.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"375 - 397"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When does the European Commission Pursue Noncompliance?\",\"authors\":\"Sivaram Cheruvu\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/14651165221087635\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Under what conditions will international compliance-monitoring institutions pursue violations of international law? The European Commission’s infringement procedure is a multi-step process that culminates at the Court of Justice of the European Union when a member state has allegedly violated European Union law. The Commission, however, does not have meaningful enforcement powers, and may potentially spend valuable time and resources on a case only for a member state to not comply with European Union law. To manage this opportunity cost of pursuing other violations of European Union law, I argue that the Commission will strategically delay advancing a case through the infringement procedure when it anticipates that the political conditions will be more favorable for compliance in the future. I provide evidence that the Commission delays infringement proceedings when it expects the election of a new government that will be more likely to comply than the incumbent government.\",\"PeriodicalId\":12077,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Union Politics\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"375 - 397\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-04-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Union Politics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221087635\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Union Politics","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221087635","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
When does the European Commission Pursue Noncompliance?
Under what conditions will international compliance-monitoring institutions pursue violations of international law? The European Commission’s infringement procedure is a multi-step process that culminates at the Court of Justice of the European Union when a member state has allegedly violated European Union law. The Commission, however, does not have meaningful enforcement powers, and may potentially spend valuable time and resources on a case only for a member state to not comply with European Union law. To manage this opportunity cost of pursuing other violations of European Union law, I argue that the Commission will strategically delay advancing a case through the infringement procedure when it anticipates that the political conditions will be more favorable for compliance in the future. I provide evidence that the Commission delays infringement proceedings when it expects the election of a new government that will be more likely to comply than the incumbent government.
期刊介绍:
European Union Politics is an international academic journal for advanced peer-reviewed research and scholarship on all aspects of the process of government, politics and policy in the European Union. It aims to stimulate debate and provide a forum to bridge the theoretical and empirical analysis on the political unification of Europe. It represents no particular school or approach, nor is it wedded to any particular methodology. In particular it welcomes articles that offer a new theoretical argument, analyze original data in a novel fashion or present an innovative methodological approach. The Editors invite submissions from all sub-fields of contemporary political science, including international relations, comparative politics, public administration, public policy and political theory.